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ABSTRACT 
 
Agglomeration research has investigated a key research question, i.e., why do 
firms in a specific industry co-locate geographically? In the agglomeration literature, it 
has been assumed that each firm has one business establishment in a cluster such that 
firms always co-locate with competitors. However, it is often observed that firms 
operate several business establishments in a cluster, so they co-locate not only with 
competitors (i.e., inter-firm agglomeration) but also with their own business 
establishments (i.e., intra-firm agglomeration). While inter-firm agglomeration is a 
counterpart to the traditional concept of agglomeration, intra-firm agglomeration is a 
new concept in agglomeration research. The separation between intra-firm and inter-
firm agglomeration raises two research questions – 1) how does intra-firm 
agglomeration differ from inter-firm agglomeration? and 2) do firms decide their 
locations for intra-firm vs. inter-firm agglomeration differently? These questions 
actually extend the key question in agglomeration research into a new setting in which 
firms have several business establishments in a cluster. I proposed that firms can extract 
more benefits but neutralize more threats from agglomeration through intra-firm 
agglomeration than through inter-firm agglomeration. I further developed research 
hypotheses to test this argument in a research context in which multi-unit firms decide 
their new establishments’ distances to competitors and their other establishments at the 
same time. The hypotheses received empirical support in an empirical setting in which 
10 large multi-unit hotel firms established new hotels in 20 U.S. cities, and several 
supplementary analyses show that these results are robust. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
Introduction 
Why do firms in a specific industry co-locate geographically? 1 Since Marshall 
(2013) introduced a new phenomenon of geographic co-location between firms in a 
specific industry (i.e., agglomeration) in the seminal book chapter published in 1890, 
“The concentration of specialized industries in particular localities,” many scholars have 
investigated this question. Overall, previous studies have provided two competing 
arguments on the effects of agglomeration on firms’ location decisions. On one hand, 
agglomeration is likely to create positive externalities (e.g., specialized labor, specialized 
non-labor inputs, knowledge transfer, and heightened demand), consequently attracting 
more firms to the geographic area (Head, Ries, & Swenson, 1995; Wang, Madhok, & 
Xiao Li, 2014). On the other hand, agglomeration is also likely to induce localized 
competition between competitors as a negative externality, eventually lowering survival 
rates of incumbents and attracting less firms to the geographic area (Baum & Mezias, 
1992; Shaver & Flyer, 2000).  
To resolve the inconclusive competing arguments, recent studies have 
investigated unexplored contingencies or examined a potential non-linear effect of 
agglomeration. For instance, the most dominant approach until now is to introduce a 
                                                 
1 My dissertation focuses on agglomeration as geographic co-location between firms in a specific industry 
and agglomeration externalities created by this co-location according to Marshall (2013). There has been 
another literature on geographic co-location between firms in diverse industries and at different 
production stages (e.g., economic geography and urban economics) (Fujita & Krugman, 2003; Fujita & 
Thisse, 2013; Ottaviano & Thisse, 2004; Porter, 1990, 1998), but the previous studies have considered two 
types of the agglomeration literatures as distinct theoretically (McCann & Folta, 2008). Please see 
McCann and Folta (2008) for a comprehensive comparison between these two agglomeration literatures. 
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firm-level heterogeneity as a contingency. While it was originally assumed that positive 
and negative externalities are equally distributed to all firms in a cluster, firm-level 
heterogeneity implies that firms in a cluster are exposed to varying levels of positive and 
negative externalities (Canina, Enz, & Harrison, 2005; Chung & Kalnins, 2001; Kalnins 
& Chung, 2004; Shaver & Flyer, 2000). Specifically, some firms more likely create 
positive externalities than others do, but they benefit less from the positive externalities 
than others do. In spite of recent theoretical developments, however, the agglomeration 
literature has not still provided enough empirical evidence to reconcile the competing 
effects of positive and negative externalities. For instance, McCann and Folta (2008) in a 
review of the agglomeration literature pointed out that the “paradox of the empirical 
record is that whereas agglomerated firms tend to perform better, they also tend to be less 
likely to survive” (2008: 550). 
Motivation 
 My dissertation tries to examine an unexplored assumption on the composition 
of agglomeration as a potential alternative to resolve the paradox mentioned above. 
Previous studies have assumed that firms have only one establishment in a cluster such 
that firms always co-locate with competitors. Thus, it is not surprising that geographic 
co-location between competitors tends to generate positive externalities on one hand but 
also negative externalities on the other. However, I argue that when firms have several 
business establishments across geographic markets, they often co-locate not only with 
competitors but also with their own establishments in a cluster. In fact, as multi-unit 
firms have become popular, it is often observed that multiple business establishments of 
the same firm co-locate near each other in some industries i.e., hotels and fast-food 
 3 
 
restaurants (Kalnins, 2004). In this case, therefore, agglomeration doesn’t mean only 
geographic co-location with competitors but also with business establishments of the 
same firm.  
 If multi-unit firms co-locate with competitors and their own business 
establishments at the same time, agglomeration can be separated into two types – intra-
firm and inter-firm agglomeration. Intra-firm agglomeration refers to geographic co-
location with business establishments of the same firm. On the other hand, inter-firm 
agglomeration refers to geographic co-location with competitors. While inter-firm 
agglomeration of a multi-unit firm is a counterpart to the traditional concept of 
agglomeration, intra-firm agglomeration of a multi-unit firm is a new and unexplored 
concept in the agglomeration literature.  
The separation between intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration of a multi-unit 
firm raises two interesting questions. The first question is how intra-firm agglomeration 
differs from inter-firm agglomeration in terms of agglomeration externalities. It is 
possible that compositional differences between intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration 
result in varying levels of positive and negative externalities captured by multi-unit 
firms. If so, the second question is whether multi-unit firms decide on their business 
establishments’ locations for intra-firm vs. inter-firm agglomeration differently. Given 
that a multi-unit firm builds a new business establishment in geographic markets where 
both competitors and its incumbent business establishments are present, it faces choices 
about the geographic distance of the new establishment relative to competitors and 
incumbent establishments to maximize positive externalities but to minimize negative 
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externalities – that is, is the new establishment’s location close to competitors or 
incumbent establishments of the same firm?  
My dissertation examines these two questions by comparing intra-firm and inter-
firm agglomeration. These questions actually extend the key question in the 
agglomeration literature (i.e., why do firms, as competitors, in a specific industry co-
locate geographically?) into a new setting in which multi-unit firms are also components 
of agglomeration.  
Contributions 
My dissertation makes several contributions to the agglomeration literature. 
First, I introduce a new concept of intra-firm agglomeration which is distinct from inter-
firm agglomeration. This distinction is important because the two types of 
agglomeration are compositionally different so that they can also provide theoretically 
different implications. Therefore, the traditional concept of agglomeration may mislead 
us about the effect of agglomeration when one fails to consider the presence of both 
types of agglomeration in a cluster.  
Second, a comparison between intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration can 
provide another reason why the agglomeration literature has resulted in the paradox of 
competing empirical evidence between positive and negative externalities. If firms are 
exposed to varying levels of positive and negative externalities resulting from intra-firm 
and inter-firm agglomeration, the two types of agglomeration should be considered to be 
an important contingency in the agglomeration literature. 
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Third, my dissertation shows that the location decisions of multi-unit firms are 
more complex than previous studies have suggested. When multi-unit firms choose their 
new establishment’s location, they should consider geographic distance not only to 
competitors but also to their own business establishments. This situation opens a 
possibility that multi-unit firms strategically choose their establishments’ distances to 
competitors and to their own establishments differently to maximize positive 
externalities and to minimize negative externalities.  
Research Context 
 The research context for my dissertation is new hotel establishments of large 
multi-unit hotel firms in the U.S. hotel industry. This research context is an attractive 
setting to study intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration. First, large multi-unit hotel 
firms (e.g., Choice Hotel International, Marriott International, Wyndham Worldwide, 
etc.) usually operate multiple hotel establishments across geographic markets, and they 
often co-locate near each other. As a result, intra-firm agglomeration of multi-unit hotel 
firms is easily observed in the U.S. hotel industry. Second, previous studies in the 
agglomeration literature have used the hotel industry as a research context (Baum & 
Haveman, 1997; Baum & Mezias, 1992; Canina et al., 2005; Chung & Kalnins, 2001; 
Kalnins & Chung, 2004; McCann & Vroom, 2010). However, they didn’t distinguish 
intra-firm agglomeration from inter-firm agglomeration. Using the same research 
context allows me to clarify the differences between the two types of agglomeration. 
 6 
 
Organization 
The rest of my dissertation is organized as follows. I begin by reviewing the 
agglomeration literature in Chapter 2. The literature review focuses on agglomeration 
between firms in a specific industry, producing similar products or providing similar 
services to customers, and agglomeration externalities created by those firms. Chapter 2 
points out the competing arguments and empirical evidence between positive and 
negative externalities and recent theoretical developments to resolve the inconclusive 
evidence.  
In Chapter 3, I develop a theoretical framework for a comparison between intra-
firm and inter-firm agglomeration. I illustrate conceptual differences between two types 
of agglomeration and then differences of agglomeration externalities captured by multi-
unit firms. Based on Chapter 3, Chapter 4 presents research hypotheses to compare 
geographic distances from a new establishment to competitors (i.e., inter-firm 
agglomeration) and to establishments of the same parent firm (i.e., intra-firm 
agglomeration) and potential contingencies in the location decisions of multi-unit firms.  
In Chapter 5, I describe research methods to test the hypotheses developed in 
Chapter 4. Research context, data source, sample selection, measurement of variables, 
and main and supplementary statistical analyses are discussed. Specifically, I analyze 
geographic distances from new hotels to incumbents, which were established by 10 
major multi-unit hotel firms in major 20 U.S. cities between 1991 and 2013. Chapter 6 
summarizes the dissertation in terms of conclusion, contributions, limitation and future 
research.   
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW ON AGGLOMERATION 
Types of Agglomeration and Positive Externalities 
Marshall (2013) has been considered to be the first work to study agglomeration 
in a specific industry. According to the seminal book chapter published in 1890, “The 
concentration of specialized industries in particular localities,” Marshall (2013) observed 
that specialized industries, producing similar or almost identical products, were often 
localized in a few places or even one place in Europe and that the products in the 
particular places were diffused over other parts of Europe. Marshall (2013) initially 
introduced several location advantages (e.g., physical conditions, the patronage of courts, 
the deliberate invitation of rulers, etc.) to explain why specialized industries tended to be 
localized. In addition, more importantly, Marshall (2013) suggested four specific 
advantages resulting from agglomeration in specialized industries – three advantages 
from a production perspective and one advantage from a customer perspective. This 
categorization of the types of the advantages laid a theoretical foundation for future 
studies on agglomeration. Following this categorization, the agglomeration literature has 
come to distinguish between supply-side and demand-side agglomerations and calls those 
advantages positive externalities (or agglomeration externalities) (McCann & Folta, 
2008).  
Supply-side agglomeration refers to the situation in which geographic co-location 
between firms in a specific industry creates positive externalities from a production 
perspective (McCann & Folta, 2008). Specifically, supply-side agglomeration is 
associated with three types of positive externalities – 1) specialized labor, 2) specialized 
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non-labor inputs, and 3) knowledge spillover. First, agglomeration allows co-located 
firms to access to specialized workers. As more firms co-locate to produce similar 
products in a specific industry, more new or skillful workers may be attracted to the 
localized industries, eventually creating a local labor market. Then, new firms or 
incumbents find it relatively easy to hire experienced and specialized workers in the 
agglomerated area (Marshall, 2013).  
Second, agglomeration can give co-located firms more opportunities to access 
specialized non-labor inputs. Geographic co-location between firms in a specific industry 
is likely to attract specialized suppliers to the agglomerated area. Because those suppliers 
mostly serve the co-located firms producing similar products, they can provide more 
specialized inputs to the co-located firms. Furthermore, the specialized inputs are more 
often used in the agglomerated area, so suppliers can have quicker return on investment 
to the specialized inputs (e.g., expensive specialized machinery) or achieve economies of 
scale in producing the specialized inputs. This eventually lowers input costs for the co-
located firms (Marshall, 2013).  
Third, agglomeration facilitates knowledge transfer between co-located firms. 
Geographic proximity provides the co-located firms more opportunities to acquire 
information and to learn knowledge from each other. Co-located firms find it relatively 
easy to hire each other’s employees, consequently transferring key tacit knowledge from 
firm to firm. In addition, co-located firms often contact and communicate through diverse 
formal and informal channels (e.g., strategic alliances, business meetings, social networks 
between managers, etc.), which have been considered to be major means of knowledge 
transfer (Ganesan, Malter, & Rindfleisch, 2005; Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; McCann & Folta, 
2008).  
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In contrast to supply-side agglomeration, demand-side agglomeration refers to a 
situation in which positive externalities are created by geographic co-location from a 
customer perspective. Demand-side agglomeration is associated with only one specific 
positive externality – heightened demand (Marshall, 2013). As firms co-locate to provide 
similar products or services to customers in local areas, this co-location tends to reduce 
search costs for customers, consequently heightening demand. If local areas are known 
for specific products or services, customers can save their search costs because they can 
directly visit the right local area without visiting other areas. Furthermore, the co-location 
between firms in a specific industry may signal customers about the level of demand in 
local areas and provide legitimacy to firms in these areas when product or service 
uncertainty is high (McCann & Folta, 2009). For example, travelers may prefer areas 
where more hotels are co-located. The concentrated hotels may signal that many other 
travelers choose these local areas for lodging and that these local areas are safe or 
convenient places to stay for travelers. Thus, when travelers have relatively less 
information about local areas, they tend to decide to stay at one of the hotels in the 
agglomerated area. 
The differences between the two types of agglomeration lead to the conclusion 
that researchers need to be careful to identify the type of agglomeration and the 
associated positive externalities as a research topic because “[a]nswers to fundamental 
questions in the agglomeration research stream differ” across or even within the supply-
side and the demand-side agglomerations (McCann & Folta, 2009: 387). For example, 
manufacturing and R&D-intensive industries (e.g., biotechnology industry) might be a 
proper research context to study supply-side agglomeration, because specialized labor, 
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specialized inputs and knowledge transfer (i.e., the positive externalities in supply-side 
agglomeration) are key factors to reduce input costs and to improve innovation 
capabilities in those industries. However, heightened demand (i.e., the positive externality 
in demand-side agglomeration) near manufacturing factories is not as important as the 
other positive externalities described above, because commodity-like products are 
relatively easy to transport across geographic markets in those industries (Alcácer & 
Chung, 2014). On the other hand, retail and service industries (e.g., fast-food restaurants 
and hotels) may be a proper research context to study demand-side agglomeration, 
because firms find it difficult to serve customers who don’t visit local areas in those 
industries. In this case, customer attraction to local areas is a critical factor for co-located 
firms to survive in retail and service industries. In addition to the difference between 
supply-side and demand-side agglomeration, Alcácer and Chung (2014) further argued 
that there are differences even between the positive externalities within supply-side 
agglomeration. Specifically, they suggested that specialized labor and knowledge transfer 
in supply-side agglomeration are more localized than specialized inputs. Following this 
logic, Alcácer and Chung (2014) studied the location decisions of foreign establishments 
in U.S. manufacturing industries and found that specialized labor and knowledge transfer 
have stronger effects on a foreign firm’s establishment decision in local markets than 
specialized non-labor inputs.  
In sum, agglomeration in my dissertation refers to geographic co-location of firms 
in a specific industry. Agglomeration is likely to create some positive externalities for co-
located firms, and the types of agglomeration can be separated into supply-side and 
demand-side agglomeration according to the positive externalities. Because 
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characteristics of the positive externalities between or even within the types of 
agglomeration differ, researchers need to clearly address a specific type of agglomeration 
and positive externalities as a research topic. 
Empirical Studies on Positive Agglomeration Externalities 
Early studies on agglomeration attempted to establish a theoretical foundation to 
explain how positive externalities are key causes of strategic outcomes (e.g., location 
decisions and performance) above and beyond simple location advantages. While 
Marshall (2013) initially introduced several location advantages (i.e., physical 
conditions, the patronage of courts, the deliberate invitation of rulers, etc.) to explain 
why firms co-locate in a specific industry, he further argued that agglomeration 
subsequently creates some positive externalities (i.e., specialized labor, specialized non-
labor inputs, knowledge spillovers, and heightened demand). Thus, it is not surprising 
that agglomeration studies have considered the positive externalities as additional 
motivations for firms to co-locate geographically above and beyond location advantages. 
For instance, Head et al. (1995) studied Japanese manufacturing plants that made 
greenfield investments in the U.S. during the 1980s. Head and colleagues found that 
Japanese manufacturing firms were more likely to choose the U.S. states where more 
Japanese plants in the same industry already existed. The effect of Japanese firm-
specific agglomeration was still strong and significant after controlling for the industry 
and U.S. state effects as indicators of location advantages (e.g., natural resources of the 
U.S. states). Thus, Head and colleagues concluded “Japan-specific agglomeration 
appears to exert a strong influence on location decisions” beyond location advantages 
(Head et al., 1995: 243). Wang et al. (2014) also studied the effect of agglomeration on 
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location decisions at different industry life-cycles in Ontario’s winery industry between 
1865 and 1974. Wang and colleagues found that agglomeration (i.e., the number of 
wineries in the Census Subdivision) attracted more new wineries in the growing phase 
of industry life-cycle after controlling for grape supply as one of location advantages. 
Therefore, the positive externalities created by agglomeration have received relatively 
strong theoretical and empirical support as causes of firm-level location decisions above 
and beyond the simpler and more traditional location advantages. 
Introduction of Negative Externalities 
On the other hand, some early studies also started raising questions about 
whether agglomeration creates only advantages for co-located firms (i.e., only positive 
externalities). These studies regarded the geographic distance between firms as an 
indicator of competition. They argued that agglomeration tends to increase localized 
competition and that increased localized competition is a disadvantage specifically 
linked to agglomeration. The agglomeration literature later came to refer to the 
disadvantages of agglomeration as negative externalities. Overall, studies on negative 
externalities have shown that agglomeration is less likely to occur if increased 
competition is expected and that co-located firms can sometimes perform worse as the 
level of agglomeration increases. 
In the economics field, Hotelling (1929) is widely known as an influential work 
that describes how the location decisions of firms are sometimes used to reduce 
competition between firms. Hotelling (1929) studied how two firms in a duopoly decide 
their locations in a linear market in which demand and transportation costs are uniformly 
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distributed and products are homogeneous. Describing the distance between firms as a 
form of product differentiation, Hotelling (1929) argued that two firms would not co-
locate closely because product differentiation (i.e., geographic distance) allows them to 
avoid price competition even when they offer otherwise homogeneous products. This 
study evoked huge research attention to location decisions between firms, and 
researchers soon extended Hotelling’s model into different settings. For example, 
Hamilton, Thisse, and Weskamp (1989) conducted theoretical analyses of Hotelling’s 
model not only in price competition (i.e., a Bertrand competition model) but also in 
production competition (i.e., a Cournot competition model). Hamilton and colleagues 
found that two firms closely co-locate only in production competition but not in price 
competition. From these results, Hamilton and colleagues concluded that agglomeration 
only occurs in production competition but not in price competition. However, recent 
studies challenged these results and further sharpened the theoretical model by 
introducing different shapes of markets or different demand distributions (Gupta, Lai, 
Pal, Sarkar, & Yu, 2004; Pal, 1998). For instance, Pal (1998) showed that agglomeration 
is less likely to occur between firms even in production competition if a market shape is 
circular. Although there are some inconclusive results in theoretical analyses, the key 
implication of these studies is that agglomeration tends to create localized competition 
as a negative externality. If competition is expected, firms are likely to locate far from 
competitors in order to reduce inter-firm competition.  
In management, scholars have also found some negative effects of agglomeration 
on firm performance in early studies. Baum and Mezias (1992) studied the effect of 
agglomeration on a firm’s survival in the Manhattan hotel industry between 1898 and 
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1990. They found that Manhattan hotels were more likely to experience low survival 
rates as they located in more geographically concentrated areas. Baum and Mezias (1992) 
concluded that this finding resulted from increased localized competition. For instance, 
hotels might fiercely compete over limited customers during the off season if the hotels 
suffer from low levels of occupancy. In addition, as more hotels co-locate in concentrated 
areas, they may suffer more from scare resources (e.g., increased rents due to limited 
property availability). In this case, firms in concentrated areas tend to survive less as the 
level of agglomeration increases. Similarly, Ingram and Roberts (2000) studied friendship 
networks between hotel managers and competition in the Sydney hotel industry. 
Although Ingram and Roberts (2000) didn’t provide a formal hypothesis for the effect of 
agglomeration on performance, the results showed that agglomeration  (i.e., geography-
localized density) was negatively related to hotel yield (i.e., revenue per available room), 
which is often used to measure performance in the hotel industry. Similar to studies 
published in economics journals, the findings of early studies by management researchers 
also imply that firms perform worse if agglomeration increases localized competition as a 
negative externality.   
In sum, recent studies have tried to balance between the positive and the negative 
effects of agglomeration by introducing the concept of negative externalities. McCann 
and Folta (2009) summarized negative externalities of agglomeration (e.g., congestion 
costs, input costs, or localized competition) in detail and compared them with positive 
externalities as well. However, as I reviewed the literature, it became clear that localized 
competition has dominated research on negative externalities.  
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Recent Theoretical Developments 
The above review on positive and negative externalities of agglomeration shows 
the difficulty in drawing simple conclusions regarding the effect of agglomeration on 
firm-level strategic outcomes. Theory predicts that the effects of agglomeration 
represent the outcome of the interplay between positive and negative externalities. As 
the level of agglomeration increases, a firm can benefit from positive externalities on 
one hand but suffer from negative externalities on the other. Empirical evidence has also 
led to some competing findings. Theoretical developments have recently taken place to 
resolve some of these inconclusive results in multiple ways.  
Firm-Level Heterogeneity 
The most dominant approach to resolve the balance between positive and 
negative externalities was to introduce a firm-level heterogeneity into agglomeration 
research. It was originally assumed that agglomeration is inherently a cluster-level 
phenomenon such that all firms within a cluster are under the same influence of positive 
or negative externalities. However, recent studies have challenged this relatively strong 
and unrealistic assumption by suggesting that firms are heterogeneous in terms of 
contribution to and benefit from agglomeration. Some firms may create positive 
externalities but do not capture positive externalities as much. On the other hand, other 
firms may just capture positive externalities created by others but not create positive 
externalities as much. This asymmetry between contributions and benefits as a firm-
level heterogeneity sheds new light on studies in agglomeration.  
Shaver and Flyer (2000) studied location decisions and survival of foreign 
greenfield investments in U.S. manufacturing industries. The authors argued that firms 
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receive different levels of benefits from positive externalities of agglomeration and that 
this difference influences their market entry decisions. Specifically, assuming that large 
firms have the best technologies, human capital, training programs, suppliers, or 
distributors, Shaver and Flyer (2000) expected that large foreign establishments gain 
less from agglomeration but provide more benefits to competitors. Consequently, 
foreign firms are less motivated to enter the U.S. states where many firms already co-
locate geographically, as greenfield investments become larger. Shaver and Flyer (2000) 
empirically supported this argument by showing that industry-specific agglomeration in 
the U.S. states still attracted more foreign greenfield investments but that this positive 
effect of agglomeration on market entry was negatively moderated by the size of foreign 
greenfield investments. Using this finding, Shaver and Flyer (2000) further argued that 
the negative effect of agglomeration on survival rates might be a misleading result if 
adverse selection is not taken into consideration. As the level of agglomeration 
increases, a cluster is likely to consist of more small firms than large firms. Because 
small firms tend to have weaker technologies, human capital, training programs, 
suppliers, and distributors, they may experience higher failure rates than large firms. The 
authors concluded that agglomeration is characterized by adverse selection, so a firm-
level heterogeneity should be considered as an important contingency in agglomeration 
research. 
Chung and Kalnins (2001) also suggested the asymmetry between firm-level 
agglomeration contributions and benefits as a form of a firm heterogeneity. In the Texas 
hotel industry, Chung and Kalnins (2001) found that small and independent hotels 
performed better in rural markets as more large and chain affiliated hotels entered those 
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markets. On the other hand, large and chain affiliated hotels performed worse in rural 
markets as more small and independent hotels were present. These results showed that 
agglomeration might lead to positive performance for small and independent hotels but 
negative performance for large and chain affiliated hotels, because the asymmetry 
between agglomeration contributions and benefits varies between different hotels. 
Kalnins and Chung (2004) similarly studied resource-seeking as a motivation of 
location decisions in the Texas hotel industry between 1992 and 2000. Assuming that 
high-resource firms create more positive externalities, Kalnins and Chung (2004) 
reconfirmed the findings of Shaver and Flyer (2000). Their results showed that high-
resource firms (i.e., branded upscale hotels) were less likely to enter geographic areas 
where many low-resource firms (e.g., unbranded hotels or branded economy hotels) 
already existed. However, Kalnins and Chung (2004) further found that low-resource 
firms were more likely to enter geographic areas where many high-resource firms 
already existed, because low-resource firms seek resource spillovers from those high-
resource firms.  
Canina et al. (2005) further studied a firm-level heterogeneity linked to different 
types of strategic orientations – differentiation and low-cost strategic orientations. Canina 
and colleagues suggested that differentiated firms (e.g., luxury hotels) are more likely 
contributors to agglomeration externalities while low-cost firms (e.g., economy hotels) 
are more likely beneficiaries of agglomeration externalities. In their study of the U.S. 
hotel industry, Canina and colleagues found that differentiated hotels (e.g., luxury hotels) 
performed worse as they co-located with more low-cost hotels, but low-cost hotels 
performed better as they co-located with more differentiated hotels. 
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Overall, the asymmetry between agglomeration contributions and benefits as a 
firm-level heterogeneity has also received strong theoretical and empirical support. The 
implication of a firm heterogeneity is that different firms experience different levels of 
the balance between positive and negative externalities. As the level of agglomeration 
increases, the balance tilts more toward negative externalities for a contributor but more 
toward positive externalities for a beneficiary. Therefore, this asymmetry influences a 
firm’s strategic choices and outcomes (e.g., location decisions and performance) in 
different ways. 
A Potential Non-Linear Effect of Agglomeration 
Given the competing effects between positive and the negative externalities, it is 
not surprising that recent studies have also investigated a potential non-linear relationship 
between the level of agglomeration and firm-level strategic outcomes. Folta, Cooper, and 
Baik (2006) argued that the effect of positive externalities on firm performance might be 
monotonic so that it is positive but at diminishing rates. On the other hand, the effect of 
negative externalities on firm performance is negative and linear. Taken together, Folta et 
al. (2006) predicted that the effect of negative externalities outweighs the effect of 
positive externalities at some point, consequently expecting a non-linear relationship 
between the level of agglomeration and firm-level performance. They analyzed a sample 
of U.S. biotechnology firms between 1973 and 1998 and found some empirical support 
for the predicted non-linear effects of agglomeration. However, the non-linear effects 
were either monotonic or inverted U-shaped, depending on the type of firm performance 
measured. 
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McCann and Vroom (2010) similarly studied price responses of incumbents 
confronting new entrants in the Texas hotel industry. McCann and Vroom (2010) argued 
that positive and negative externalities created by new entrants depend on the size of new 
entrants. As new entrant size becomes larger, the new entrants are likely to create more 
positive externalities. For instance, if larger hotels are established, they will spend more 
on advertising and eventually attract more customers to the market. Thus, incumbents are 
expected to increase prices because they expect that the large new entries represent an 
opportunity to benefit from newly-created positive externalities. However, McCann and 
Vroom (2010) also argued that new entrants also increase localized competition as a 
negative externality. As new entrants are larger, they add too many rooms, thus making 
overcapacity a problem in local markets. Thus, the authors expected that the marginal 
costs of negative externalities would outweigh the marginal benefits from positive 
externalities at some point. Following this logic, McCann and Vroom (2010) found an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between entrant size and incumbent prices.  
Lastly, Wang et al. (2014) studied industry life-cycles as a contingency in the 
relationship between agglomeration and survival rates and new establishments in the 
Ontario winery industry. Wang et al. (2014) found that the effect of agglomeration on 
survival rates of Ontario wineries was only positive at the mature phase but not 
statistically significant at the growth phase. On the other hand, they also found that the 
effect of agglomeration on the establishment of new wineries was only positive during 
the growth phase but not statistically significant at the mature phase. This finding implies 
that agglomeration externalities vary at different phases of product life-cycles. 
Specifically, positive and negative externalities are higher at the mature phase than at the 
growing phase.   
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Multiple Product Dimensions 
The last approach used in an attempt to resolve the inconclusive results between 
positive and negative externalities is to introduce multiple product dimensions in 
agglomeration research. As I reviewed above, early studies, especially those published 
in economics journals, consistently assumed homogeneous products and considered only 
distance as a form of product differentiation (Hotelling, 1929). However, Baum and 
Haveman (1997) relaxed the assumption of product homogeneity and added two more 
product dimensions – price and size – to geographic distance. Specifically, Baum and 
Haveman (1997) studied location decisions in the Manhattan hotel industry between 
1898 and 1990 and found that new hotels co-located closely to incumbent hotels which 
were “similar on one product dimension (price) to benefit from the positive externalities, 
but different on another product dimension (size), to avoid localized competition and 
create complementary differences” (1997: 304). Put differently, these multiple product 
dimensions were used to disentangle positive externalities from negative ones. 
Therefore, Baum and Haveman (1997) concluded that firms can benefit from positive 
externalities and lessen negative externalities (e.g., localized competition) at the same 
time by coordinating multiple product dimensions.  
Summary  
Early studies in agglomeration research tried to answer a key research question – 
why do firms in a specific industry co-locate geographically? They laid a theoretical 
foundation based on the assumption that positive externalities of agglomeration, above 
and beyond other location advantages, are key causes for firms to co-locate. Marshall 
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(2013) initially introduced the concept of agglomeration and some location advantages as 
causes of agglomeration. Then, he further suggested that agglomeration itself is likely to 
provide four specific advantages from production and customer perspectives (i.e., 
positive externalities). Following this legacy, later studies have categorized 
agglomeration into supply-side and demand-side agglomeration according to the types of 
positive externalities generated.  
However, some studies have raised questions about whether agglomeration is 
always good for co-located firms. Some evidences suggested that agglomeration is likely 
to increase localized competition (i.e., negative externalities), so firms in densely 
concentrated areas are less likely to survive. To solve the inconclusive competing effects 
between the positive and the negative externalities, recent studies have extended 
agglomeration theory into unexplored assumptions (e.g., firm heterogeneity and multiple 
product dimensions) on one hand or explored potential non-linear effects on the other 
hand.  
The most dominant approach among prior research is to introduce firm-level 
heterogeneity. A firm-level heterogeneity implies that firms operating in the same cluster 
can be exposed to varying levels of positive and negative externalities. Thus, it is 
expected that a firm’s strategic outcomes (e.g., location decisions and performance) differ 
not only between agglomerations but also within agglomeration. Until now product 
quality and size of firms have mostly been considered as indicators of externality 
contributors and beneficiaries.  
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Figure 1 is a comprehensive model of the reviewed agglomeration studies. It 
integrates both early studies and recent theoretical developments in the agglomeration 
literature discussed above. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A Multi-Unit Firm as a Component of Agglomeration 
The literature review reveals one challenge, with regard to my dissertation, that 
the current agglomeration literature faces. Previous studies assume that a firm has only 
one business establishment in a cluster. In this case, a firm is a single-unit firm, or a 
multi-unit firm has only one business establishment in a cluster. This assumption implies 
that a firm always co-locates with competitors in a cluster. However, as multi-unit firms 
have become common in many industries, several business establishments of the same 
firm often co-locate near each other (Kalnins, 2004). In my dissertation, a unit is defined 
as a business establishment, and a multi-unit firm is a parent firm operating several 
business establishments (see Core Concepts section below for a full definition). For 
instance, a parent hotel firm often has multiple hotel establishments, and some of them 
are observed in the same geographic markets. Similarly, a parent fast-food firm often has 
multiple fast-food restaurants in the same geographic markets. In this case, it is possible 
that each hotel or fast-food restaurant co-locates not only with competitors but also with 
other units of the same parent firm in a cluster. In this case, agglomeration doesn’t mean 
only co-location with competitors but also co-location with other units of the same parent 
firm.  
 The introduction of a multi-unit firm as a component of agglomeration implies 
that agglomeration of a multi-unit firm can be separated into two types – intra-firm 
agglomeration and inter-firm agglomeration. Intra-firm agglomeration refers to 
geographic co-location of a unit with other units of the same firm. On the other hand, 
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inter-firm agglomeration refers to geographic co-location of a unit with competitors. 
While inter-firm agglomeration of a multi-unit firm is a counterpart to agglomeration 
between competitors, intra-firm agglomeration of a multi-unit firm is a new and 
unexplored concept in the agglomeration literature.  
 The separation between intra-firm and inter-firm agglomerations of a multi-unit 
firm raise several interesting questions – 1) how does intra-firm agglomeration differ 
from inter-firm agglomeration in terms of agglomeration externalities? and 2) does a 
multi-unit firm decide its location for intra-firm vs. inter-firm agglomeration differently? 
These questions actually extend the key question in the agglomeration literature (i.e., 
why do firms co-locate geographically?) into a new setting in which a multi-unit firm is 
a composition of agglomeration. Given the conceptual equivalence between the 
traditional concept of agglomeration (i.e., geographic co-location with competitors) and 
inter-firm agglomeration of a multi-unit firm, it is expected that previous findings can 
apply to inter-firm agglomeration. However, it is in question that the same findings can 
apply to intra-firm agglomeration too.  
 This dissertation tries to investigate this difference between intra-firm and inter-
firm agglomeration by studying the location decisions of multi-unit firms. In this 
chapter, I develop a theoretical framework for intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration. 
My main argument is that a multi-unit firm can extract more agglomeration benefits on 
one hand but neutralize more threats of localized competition created by agglomeration 
on the other, if it co-locates with its other units (i.e., intra-firm agglomeration) than with 
competitors (i.e., inter-firm agglomeration). Given the competing forces between 
positive and negative externalities, therefore, the balance may tilt more toward positive 
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externalities for intra-firm agglomeration but more toward negative externalities for 
inter-firm agglomeration. This argument implies that a multi-unit firm willingly tries to 
co-locate more closely with its units than with competitors. 
Core Concepts 
 I define several core concepts here for further theory development. By unit I 
refer to a business establishment, e.g., a single retail store or manufacturing plant (Greve 
& Baum, 2001). Thus, a multi-unit firm means a parent firm having several business 
establishments (Greve & Baum, 2001). For instance, as I noted earlier, a parent hotel 
firm often operates several hotels across geographic markets, and each hotel provides 
almost identical service (i.e., lodging) to customers. In addition, a parent fast-food firm 
often operates multiple restaurants across geographic markets, and each restaurant 
provides very similar (or identical) foods to customers. 
 Given this definition of a unit and a multi-unit firm, intra-firm agglomeration 
refers to geographic co-location of a unit with other units of the same parent firm. For 
instance, multiple hotels of a parent hotel firm may co-locate near each other, and fast-
food restaurants of a parent fast-food firm often co-locate near each other in geographic 
markets. Although a parent firm can also have several subsidiaries or chain brands that 
target different product segments to reduce competition between units or to occupy a 
wide customer base, intra-firm agglomeration still means geographic co-location of a 
unit with other units regardless of different subsidiaries or chain brands. For instance, 
Marriott International as a parent hotel firm often has not only several hotels of one 
chain brand (e.g., Courtyard) but also other hotels of different chain brands (e.g., 
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Residence Inn and Springhill Suites) in geographic markets. Then, it is often observed 
that one hotel of Courtyard closely co-locates not only near hotels (i.e., units) of 
Residence Inn and Springhill Suites but also near other Courtyard hotels (i.e. units).  
 In contrast, inter-firm agglomeration refers to geographic co-location of a unit 
with competitors, whether a competitor is a multi-unit firm or a single-unit firm. For 
instance, it is the case that Courtyard (Marriot International), Embassy Suites (Hilton 
Worldwide) and Holiday Inn (Intercontinental Hotels Group) co-locate near each other 
in geographic markets. 
 Figure 2 illustrates the differences between the traditional concept of 
agglomeration and the concept of intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration in my 
dissertation. The figure on the left side represents the traditional concept of 
agglomeration that each firm is a single-unit firm or that a multi-unit firm has only one 
business establishment in a cluster. In this case, agglomeration means geographic co-
location only with competitors. For instance, Firm A (a black circle) at the center of a 
cluster is a single-unit firm, and it co-locates only with competitors. On the other hand, 
the figure on the right side shows a situation that a multi-unit firm has several units in a 
cluster. For instance, Unit 1 of Firm B (a black circle) at the center of a cluster co-
locates not only with other three units (i.e., Unit 2, Unit 3 and Unit 4) but also with 
competitors. That is, Unit 1 of Firm B has both intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration 
in a cluster.  
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Intra-Firm vs. Inter-Firm Agglomeration 
The compositional difference between intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration 
implies that a multi-unit firm may be under different influences of positive and negative 
externalities. As I reviewed in Chapter 2, previous studies in the agglomeration literature 
have suggested that geographic co-location between firms creates positive externalities 
(i.e., specialized labor, specialized input, knowledge transfer, and heightened demand) 
on one hand and negative externalities (i.e., localized competition) on the other. Then, it 
was assumed that agglomeration is inherently a cluster-level phenomenon such that all 
firms within a cluster are under the same influence of positive or negative externalities. 
Given the positive and negative externalities created in a cluster, however, I expect that a 
multi-unit firm can extract more benefits from positive externalities and neutralize more 
threats of negative externalities, when it co-locates with its other units (i.e., intra-firm 
agglomeration) than with competitors (i.e., inter-firm agglomeration).  
Appropriation of Positive Externalities 
Given the positive externalities created in a cluster, it has been assumed that 
firms within a cluster are under the same effect of positive externalities (Marshall, 2013; 
McCann & Folta, 2009). In other words, positive externalities are equally distributed 
among firms within a cluster. However, I argue that appropriation capabilities of a multi-
unit firm can vary through intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration. I define the 
appropriation capabilities as a multi-unit firm’s abilities to capture benefits from positive 
externalities created in a cluster. Specifically, I expect that compared with inter-firm 
agglomeration, intra-firm agglomeration improves appropriation capabilities such that a 
multi-unit firm can extract more benefits from positive externalities. 
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 When a multi-unit firm’s unit co-locates with competitors (i.e., inter-firm 
agglomeration), appropriation of positive externalities is mostly based on two 
mechanisms – 1) geographic proximity and 2) reciprocal cooperation between 
competitors. First, a firm is more likely to benefit from positive externalities as it is 
geographically closer to competitors. In the hotel industry, for instance, if a hotel’s 
rooms are already filled, customers that intended to stay at that hotel may look for 
alternative hotels nearby. In this case, the geographic proximity to that hotel may 
influence the customers’ decisions to choose one of the adjacent hotels. However, it is 
not clear whether the customers actually choose a focal hotel among other adjacent 
hotels, so appropriation of positive externalities occurs by chance. Another mechanism 
is the reciprocal cooperation between a focal firm and competitors. A focal firm and 
competitors can actively cooperate to appropriate positive externalities reciprocally. In 
the hotel industry, for instance, it is well known that hotel managers have used two 
popular cooperation practices to extract more benefits from positive externalities – the 
referral practice and the call-around practice (Kalnins, 2006). The referral practice 
means that hotel managers send overflowed customers to other hotels reciprocally. 
Similarly, Ingram and Roberts (2000) studied friendship-based cooperation between 
Sydney hotels and showed that friendship ties between hotel managers facilitated the use 
of the referral practice reciprocally. Put differently, hotel managers refer overflow 
customers only to hotels where their friend managers work. Hotel managers also widely 
use the call-around practice meaning that they call each other to share key information, 
such as occupancy rates. This information helps hotel managers to decide adjacent 
hotels to which they will send overflow customers. However, this reciprocal cooperation 
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is mostly based on trust between competitors. In this case, the risk of opportunistic 
behaviors is relatively high, so competitors can provide wrong information or just 
receive more referred customers than those they actually refer (Kalnins, 2006).  
 When a multi-unit firm’s units co-locate near each other (i.e., intra-firm 
agglomeration), appropriation of positive externalities is also mostly based on two 
mechanisms – 1) geographic proximity and 2) formal cooperation within a multi-unit 
firm. Geographic proximity influences appropriation of positive externalities for intra-
firm agglomeration in the same way as inter-firm agglomeration. On the other hand, 
another mechanism is different in that formal cooperation occurs between a focal unit 
and other units that belong to the same multi-unit firm. This formal cooperation may 
substantially improve appropriation capabilities of a multi-unit firm for the following 
two reasons. First, when a multi-unit firm’s units co-locate near each other, it can 
intentionally help its units to capture benefits from positive externalities. In the hotel 
industry, for instance, if adjacent other hotels of the same parent firm have the 
availability to provide rooms, a focal hotel may mostly send overflow customers to 
those hotels and have no reason to send them to competitor hotels. Second, formal 
cooperation within a multi-unit firm tends to reduce the risk of opportunistic behaviors 
between co-located units. In the hotel industry, for instance, a parent hotel firm is likely 
to have the integrated reservation system and to share information through the formal 
reporting lines and company policy. Thus, a focal hotel has more precise information, 
such as occupancy rates, of co-located hotels of the same firm and knows the hotels to 
which it refers overflow customers. Thus, a multi-unit firm can deploy the referral 
practice and the call-around practice more effectively to appropriate positive 
externalities of intra-firm agglomeration. 
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 In sum, this comparison between intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration implies 
that a multi-unit firm can extract more benefits from positive externalities through intra-
firm agglomeration than through inter-firm agglomeration. When a multi-unit firm’s 
units co-locate near each other, it can improve appropriation capabilities through formal 
cooperation. In contrast, when it co-locates with competitors, it mostly relies on 
reciprocal cooperation that is more exposed to the risk of opportunistic behaviors than 
formal cooperation. My argument here is not to say that a multi-unit firm cannot capture 
benefits from positive externalities through inter-firm agglomeration, but that it can 
capture more through intra-firm agglomeration than through inter-firm agglomeration in 
the given positive externalities created in a cluster. 
Protection from Negative Externalities 
Given negative externalities created in a cluster, it has also been assumed that 
negative externalities are equally distributed among firms within a cluster (McCann & 
Folta, 2009). However, I argue that protection capabilities of a multi-unit firm can vary 
through intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration. I define protection capabilities as a 
multi-unit firm’s abilities to neutralize or to avoid threats from negative externalities 
created in a cluster. Since it has been known that increased localized competition (a 
major negative externality) is a threat to a firm’s survival (Baum & Mezias, 1992), firms 
may try to protect themselves from localized competition. I expect that compared with 
inter-firm agglomeration, intra-firm agglomeration improves protection capabilities such 
that a multi-unit firm can better neutralize or avoid threats from negative externalities. 
When a multi-unit firm co-locates with competitors (i.e., inter-firm 
agglomeration), protection from negative externalities is mostly based on one 
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mechanism – tacit coordination of inter-firm competition. When competitors co-locate 
near each other, localized competition arises as a form of inter-firm competition. The 
inter-firm competition literature suggests that a firm’s performance depends on 
competitive actions and responses (Ketchen, Snow, & Hoover, 2004; Smith, Ferrier, & 
Ndofor, 2001). In addition, as the intensity of competition increases, a firm is likely to 
experience lower performance (Porter, 1980, 1985). Then, one way to protect co-located 
firms from increased localized competition is to coordinate their competitive activities 
tacitly in order to reduce the intensity of competition between them (e.g., tacit 
coordination). Tacit coordination is different from explicit coordination in that 
competitors cannot share information and coordinate their competitive activities 
formally (Friedman, 1983). In tacit coordination, competitors tend to recognize or learn 
their strategic intentions by competitive interactions in markets (Friedman, 1983). 
However, it is well known that tacit coordination tends to be unstable and that 
competitors often face escalated competition (e.g., price war) as a result of the 
destabilized tacit coordination (Feuerstein, 2005). Thus, although tacit coordination may 
protect co-located firms from negative externalities, they are still under threats from 
localized competition as a negative externality. 
On the other hand, when a multi-unit firm’s units co-locate near each other (i.e., 
intra-firm agglomeration), protection from negative externalities is mostly based on 
another mechanism – formal coordination of intra-firm competition. In contrast to inter-
firm agglomeration, intra-firm agglomeration is likely to provoke competition between 
units of the same multi-unit firm (i.e., intra-firm competition). The intra-firm 
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competition literature suggests that competition between units within a multi-unit firm 
exists when their businesses are overlapped. Phelps and Fuller (2000) suggested that 
there are three types of intra-firm competition in multinational enterprises (MNEs): 1) 
competition for intermediate products or services, 2) competition for capabilities, and 3) 
competition for charters or mandates. Of the three, competition for charters or mandates 
is related to the phenomenon of intra-firm agglomeration. A charter, or mandate, is 
defined as a responsibility for a specific business domain or product market (Birkinshaw 
& Lingblad, 2005). For instance, Galunic and Eisenhardt (1996, 2001) argued that 
multi-divisional firms often have overlapped business domains or turf between 
divisions. Then, these overlaps sometimes make the divisions compete with each other 
for achieving the charter against other divisions. Although this type of intra-firm 
competition mostly results in the gain or the loss of charters for units, intra-firm 
competition has been perceived as advantageous to a multi-unit firm in general. Kalnins 
(2004) summarized four advantages of intra-firm competition in favor of multi-unit 
firms: 1) improvement of efficiency and resourcefulness between divisions, 2) entry 
deterrence to rival firms, 3) protection from cooperation between divisions against 
headquarters, and 4) enhanced profits from intra-firm competition. In the franchised 
fast-food industry, for instance, franchisors usually receive revenue-based royalty fees 
from franchised restaurants. Thus, if competition between franchised restaurants 
increases revenues, multi-unit franchisors can receive more royalty fees from the 
increased revenues. Furthermore, intra-firm competition between franchisees in local 
areas deters rival franchisors or franchisees of rival franchisors from opening new fast-
food restaurants in those areas.  
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Drawing on the advantages of intra-firm competition in favor of multi-unit firms, 
Phelps and Fuller (2000) suggested that intra-firm competition is often led and 
coordinated by headquarters of MNEs. This intra-firm coordination by headquarters 
tends to improve protection capabilities from negative externalities. On one hand, 
headquarters can facilitate competition among their units to achieve the advantages of 
intra-firm competition. On the other hand, if intra-firm competition is so severe that it 
actually has a negative impact on performance not only at unit-level but also at firm-
level, headquarters can intervene to reduce intra-firm competition. This formal 
coordination by headquarters is effective, because headquarters can shares precise 
information internally and because headquarters have more control on competitive 
activities of their units. Therefore, a firm with intra-firm agglomeration is more likely to 
neutralize or to avoid the negative externalities. 
In sum, this comparison between intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration implies 
that a multi-unit firm can neutralize or avoid more threats from negative externalities 
through intra-firm agglomeration than through inter-firm agglomeration. When a multi-
unit firm’s units co-locate near each other, it can improve protection capabilities through 
formal coordination of intra-firm competition. In contrast, when it co-locates with 
competitors, it mostly relies on tacit coordination of inter-firm competition. I argue that 
formal coordination more effectively coordinate competitive activities between units 
within a firm than tacit coordination does competitive activities between competitors. 
Again, my argument here is not to say that a multi-unit firm cannot protect itself from 
negative externalities through tacit coordination of inter-firm agglomeration, but that it 
can protect more through formal coordination of intra-firm agglomeration than through 
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tacit coordination of inter-firm agglomeration in the given negative externalities created 
in a cluster. 
Operational Synergy 
In addition, unlike geographic co-location between competitors, geographic co-
location between units of the same parent firm can create operational synergy as an 
advantage of intra-firm agglomeration over inter-firm agglomeration. Operational 
synergy occurs when operational activities are shared between a firm’s business units, in 
turn increasing operational efficiencies (Chatterjee, 1986). While operational synergy 
has been considered to be a key benefit in the diversification and mergers & acquisitions 
(M&As) strategies (Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009; Hitt, 
Tihanyi, Miller, & Connelly, 2006; Wan, Hoskisson, Short, & Yiu, 2011), I expect that 
operational synergy can be also created when units of the same parent firm closely co-
locate. 
When a multi-unit firm’s units co-locate near each other (i.e., intra-firm 
agglomeration), the firm’s units have opportunities to share key operational activities, 
potentially creating operational synergy effects. First, the firm’s units can participate in 
co-purchasing key input resources. Because they provide similar products or services to 
customers in the same geographic markets, they are more likely to use similar input 
resources. In this case, they can increase their bargaining power against suppliers by co-
purchasing key input resources. The increased bargaining power may allow them to 
lower input costs, in turn increasing operating efficiency. For example, hotels of the 
same parent firm often relay on online procurement systems to procure key hotel 
supplies (e.g., ingredients for food services, tissues, bed sets, etc.) from local suppliers 
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(Kothari, Hu, & Roehl, 2005). In the hotel industry, this co-purchasing practice tends to 
be used for consistent services across their hotels. Because hotels use the same input 
resources procured from the same online procurement systems, they are likely to provide 
similar levels of product or service quality to customers. However, this co-purchasing 
practice also benefits individual co-located hotels because they can save their input costs 
by increasing bargaining power and transaction costs by using the common online 
procurement systems (Kothari et al., 2005). Second, the firm’s units can take advantage 
of resource sharing to increase operational efficiency. Because their locations are close, 
they can save operating costs by sharing duplicated assets or activities. For example, in 
the hotel industry, co-located hotels of the same parent firm often have the common 
transportation vehicles for employees (e.g., transportations for an employee commute) 
and customers (e.g., transportations between hotels and airports). In addition, they often 
share their employees because their employees make a contract with the parent firm not 
with individual hotels. For example, when one hotel needs more employees to serve the 
large events, co-located hotels of the same parent firm often cooperate and send their 
employees for the events. These types of resource sharing can reduce fixed costs (e.g., 
transportation costs, human resource costs, etc.), in turn increasing operational 
efficiency. 
Summary  
 Taking into account multi-unit firms as components of agglomeration introduces 
two types of agglomeration – inter-firm and intra-firm agglomerations. Comparison 
between two types of agglomeration shows several differences. First, there are 
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compositional differences between intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration. While a 
multi-unit firm often co-locates with competitors (i.e., inter-firm agglomeration), it also 
co-locates with its other units (i.e., intra-firm agglomeration). More importantly, a multi-
unit firm can have intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration at the same time in a cluster. 
Second, positive and negative externalities are asymmetric between inter-firm and intra-
firm agglomerations. Compared with inter-firm agglomeration, intra-firm agglomeration 
improves more both appropriation capabilities from positive externalities and protection 
capabilities from negative externalities. Third, unlike inter-firm agglomeration, intra-
firm agglomeration tends to create operational synergy by sharing key operational 
activities and resources. 
Taken together, when a multi-unit firm co-locates with its units and competitors 
in a cluster, a net effect of geographic co-location with its units is more positive than one 
with competitors. Again, I don’t argue that a multi-unit firm cannot benefit from inter-
firm agglomeration et al. Instead, my argument is that a multi-unit firm can benefit 
relatively more from intra-firm agglomeration than from inter-firm agglomeration. 
Stated differently, if the balance between benefits from positive externalities and threats 
from negative externalities is considered, intra-firm agglomeration may tilt the balance 
more toward positive externalities, but inter-firm agglomeration may tilt the balance 
more toward negative externalities. Table 1 summarizes this comparison between intra-
firm and inter-firm agglomeration.  
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Table 1. Comparison between Intra-Firm and Inter-Firm Agglomerations of a 
Multi-Unit Firm 
 Intra-Firm Agglomeration  Inter-Firm Agglomeration  
Definition 
• Geographic co-location of a 
unit with units of the same 
multi-unit firm 
• Geographic co-location of a 
unit with competitors 
Appropriation 
Capabilities  
High 
 More appropriation of positive 
externalities created in a 
cluster 
 Appropriation mechanisms 
o Geographic proximity 
o Formal cooperation 
between units within a 
firm 
Low 
 Less appropriation of positive 
externalities created in a 
cluster 
 Appropriation mechanisms 
o Geographic proximity 
o Reciprocal cooperation 
between competitors 
Protection 
Capabilities  
High 
 More protection from negative 
externalities created in a 
cluster 
 Protection mechanism 
o Formal coordination of 
intra-firm competition 
within a firm 
Low 
 Less protection from negative 
externalities created in a 
cluster 
 Protection mechanism 
o Tacit coordination of 
inter-firm competition 
between competitors 
Operational 
Synergy 
High 
 Increased operational 
efficiencies by sharing key 
operational activities and 
saving operational costs 
 
Low 
 No sharing key operational 
activities 
 
Implications 
 Location decision: Closer 
distance to units of the same 
multi-unit firm 
 Location decision: Farther 
distance to competitors 
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Implications 
The fact that a multi-unit firm can have several units in a cluster provides several 
implications for the location decisions of multi-unit firms. First, assuming that a multi-
unit firm establishes a new unit in a cluster, it should consider geographic distances from 
a new unit not only to its own units but also to competitors. Because the balance 
between positive and negative externalities differs between intra-firm and inter-firm 
agglomeration, it is possible that a multi-unit firm may choose a new unit’s distance to 
its own units and to competitors differently. Second, the two types of agglomeration can 
be an important contingency on previous findings in the agglomeration literature. If the 
traditional concept of agglomeration can be separated into intra-firm and inter-firm 
agglomeration, it is possible that previous findings were confounded by the competing 
effects of the two types of agglomeration. In fact, McCann and Folta (2008) in a review 
of agglomeration research pointed out that the “paradox of the empirical record is that 
whereas agglomerated firms tend to perform better, they also tend to be less likely to 
survive” (McCann & Folta, 2008: 550). Different types of agglomeration may be able to 
partially provide the reason why this paradox has been observed in the agglomeration 
literature. Lastly, in contrast to a single-unit firm, a multi-unit firm relies on different 
governance structures for its units. While a single-unit firm mostly operate its unit 
directly, a multi-unit firm uses either a direct operation or a franchising governance 
structure (Bradach, 1997; Combs, Ketchen, Shook, & Short, 2011; Combs, Michael, & 
Castrogiovanni, 2004; Perryman & Combs, 2012; Yin & Zajac, 2004). Therefore, this 
governance structure choice raises interesting questions about how a multi-unit firm 
decides a new unit’s location according to different governance structures.  
 41 
 
In Chapter 4, using the theoretical framework developed in this chapter, I 
develop hypotheses in order to answer the second question of my dissertation, i.e., does 
a multi-unit firm decide its location for intra-firm vs. inter-firm agglomeration 
differently? First, I develop a research hypothesis to test the difference between intra-
firm and inter-firm agglomeration in a research context in which a multi-unit firm 
establishes a new unit with some level of proximity to its incumbent units and those of 
competitors. Specifically, I compare two geographic distances – one from a new unit to 
units of the same parent firm and another from a new unit to competitors. Second, I will 
consider several firm-level heterogeneities as potential contingencies in the distance 
difference between intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration according to the previous 
findings in the agglomeration literature. Specifically, I focus on the asymmetry between 
contributions and benefits as a firm-level heterogeneity that, as I reviewed in Chapter 2, 
has received dominant attention in the agglomeration literature. Lastly, as I noted above, 
multi-unit firms tend to face a choice of governance structures (either direct operation or 
franchising) for their new units. Drawing on the franchising literature, I will study how 
the distance difference between intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration is contingent on 
governance structures of new units (i.e., either direct operation or franchising). 
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CHAPTER 4 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Geographic Distance from a New Establishment to Incumbents 
The location decision of a new establishment provides a proper research context 
to compare differences between intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration. When a multi-
unit firm plans to establish a new unit in geographic markets, this situation raises an 
interesting strategic issue if there are both its units and competitors’ units in those 
markets. The strategic issue is how closely a new unit should locate near its own units 
and competitors’ units. If there is no difference between intra-firm and inter-firm 
agglomeration in terms of agglomeration externalities, the geographic distances of a new 
unit to its other units and to competitors’ units will not be different. In contrast, as I 
argued earlier, if the balance between positive and negative externalities varies between 
intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration, geographic distances of a new unit to its other 
units and to competitors are expected to capture this difference. As positive externalities 
are dominant, a multi-unit firm has an incentive to locate more closely to incumbents 
(either its unit or a competitor’s). On the other hand, as negative externalities are more 
dominant, a firm may locate farther from incumbents (either its unit or competitors’). 
Therefore, I assume that a multi-unit firm decides its new establishment’s location at 
which the net effect of positive and negative externalities is maximized. 
Level of Analysis: A New Establishment  
 I chose a new establishment as the level of analysis for the hypotheses 
development. This level of analysis provides several advantages to study differences 
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between intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration and their effects on the location 
decisions of multi-unit firms. First, a new establishment as a level of analysis allows me 
to identify intra-firm or inter-firm agglomeration easily. If a new establishment and co-
located incumbents belong to the same multi-unit firm, it becomes intra-firm 
agglomeration. In contrast, if they are competitors, whether they are different multi-unit 
firms or single-unit firms, it is inter-firm agglomeration.  
Second, this level of analysis allows me to investigate the effect of 
heterogeneous characteristics of a new establishment on location decisions. A new 
establishment of a multi-unit firm can be heterogeneous in terms of quality and size – 
two factors that have been studied as major attributes of a contributor or a beneficiary in 
the agglomeration literature. Using these heterogeneities of new establishments, I will 
further compare the location decisions of multi-unit firms for intra-firm and inter-firm 
agglomeration.  
Lastly, a new establishment as a level of analysis helps to overcome previous 
challenges to a definitional clarity of agglomeration and its operationalization. While 
previous studies agree that agglomeration externalities tend to attenuate over geographic 
distance, there is much less consensus on how far agglomeration externalities extend 
(McCann & Folta, 2008). This lack of clarity has led to different definitions of 
boundaries of agglomeration (e.g., U.S. state, U.S. metropolitan statistical areas, U.S. 
census divisions and U.S. zip codes). Furthermore, these definitions of agglomeration 
have been mostly based on geographic segmentation for administrative sovereignty 
(e.g., U.S. states) or statistics (e.g., U.S. metropolitan statistics areas, U.S. census 
divisions). Thus, these definitions are less likely to reflect realistic geographic scopes to 
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which the agglomeration externalities extend in different research contexts. Using a new 
establishment as a level of analysis allows me to overcome this challenge by considering 
a certain distance range of geographic scopes from a new establishment as the boundary 
of agglomeration.   
Intra-Firm Agglomeration vs. Inter-Firm Agglomeration 
The overarching hypothesis of this dissertation is about the effect of intra-firm 
vs. inter-firm agglomeration on the location decisions of multi-unit firms. Given the 
competing positive and negative externalities, a multi-unit firm may decide to locate its 
new units adjacent to incumbents in order to maximize appropriation from positive 
externalities but to minimize threats from negative externalities. As I noted earlier, I 
assume that a multi-unit firm decides its new establishment’s location at which a net 
effect of positive and negative externalities is maximized. As geographic distance of a 
new unit is close to incumbents, positive and negative externalities both are likely to 
increase. Thus, a multi-unit firm will decide its new unit’s location as the place at which 
the marginal benefit from positive externalities most outweighs the marginal threat from 
negative externalities. If positive externalities are still dominant, a multi-unit firm has an 
incentive to locate more closely to incumbents. In contrast, as negative externalities are 
more dominant, a firm may locate farther from incumbents. 
Theoretical comparison between intra-firm and inter-firm agglomerations shows 
that relative to inter-firm agglomeration, intra-firm agglomeration of a multi-unit firm is 
more likely to improve appropriation capabilities from positive externalities and 
protection capabilities from negative externalities. This implies that if geographic 
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distances of a new unit to its other units and to competitors are identical, a multi-unit 
firm can extract more benefit from positive externalities but neutralize more threats from 
negative externalities through intra-firm agglomeration than through inter-firm 
agglomeration. Then, a multi-unit firm may still have an incentive to locate closer to its 
incumbent units than to competitors. Although the geographic distance of a new unit to 
its incumbent units is closer than that to competitors, the new unit may be exposed to 
similar levels of threats from negative externalities but to higher levels of benefit from 
positive externalities. Stated differently, the net effect of positive and negative 
externalities is higher when a new unit of a multi-unit firm is closer to its incumbents 
than to competitors. 
In addition, the comparison between intra-firm and inter-firm agglomerations 
also shows that relative to inter-firm agglomeration, intra-firm agglomeration tends to 
create operational synergy by sharing key operational activities and resources. As a new 
unit’s location is closer to incumbent units of the same multi-unit firm, those units are 
more likely to have opportunities to reduce operating costs and to increase operational 
efficiency. On the other hand, a similar type of operational synergy doesn’t emerge as a 
new unit’s location is closer to competitors. Therefore, multi-unit firms have incentives 
to establish new units close to their incumbent units but not close to competitors in terms 
of operational synergy. 
Taken together, I expect that a multi-unit firm will establish a new unit closer to 
its incumbent units than to competitors. Put differently, the geographic distance from a 
new unit to incumbent units of the same multi-unit firm is shorter than that to 
competitors. 
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Hypothesis 1: A multi-unit firm will establish a new unit closer to its incumbent units 
than to competitors. 
Contributor vs. Beneficiary 
I further consider potential contingencies in the difference of geographic 
distances between intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration. The literature review shows 
that all firms are not identical in terms of agglomeration contributions and benefits. 
Some firms contribute to positive externalities without capturing as much, but others just 
benefit from existing positive externalities without contributing as much. This 
asymmetry between contributions and benefits as a firm-level heterogeneity is the most 
dominant approach to resolve the competing arguments between positive and negative 
externalities. Quality and size have been usually considered as firm-level attributes of 
contributors or beneficiaries (Chung & Kalnins, 2001; Kalnins & Chung, 2004; Shaver 
& Flyer, 2000). Similarly, I consider the quality and size of a new establishment as 
attributes of contributors or beneficiaries and develop hypotheses about the effects of 
quality and size as a contingency on location decision for intra-firm vs. inter-firm 
agglomeration. 
As a new established unit has high quality and large size, it is more likely to 
create positive externalities but less likely to benefit from the existing positive 
externalities. Kalnins and Chung (2004) studied the Texas hotel industry, and argued that 
branded upscale hotels represent high quality and resources (e.g., advertisement 
expenses or quality management) to heighten demand (the positive externalities in 
demand-side agglomeration). Because branded upscale hotels signal to customers a 
commitment to “an appropriate quality level,” customers are willing to choose these 
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hotels first when they cannot inspect each hotel directly (Kalnins & Chung, 2004: 692). 
Thus, branded upscale hotels are more likely to attract customers, and co-located hotels 
benefit from the heightened demand if branded upscale hotels have excess customers.  
Similarly, Shaver and Flyer (2000) argued that large establishment size 
represents “best technologies, human capital, training programs, suppliers, or 
distribution” (Shaver & Flyer, 2000: 1175). Thus, a firm with large size may gain less 
but benefit competitors. Their results supported their argument that a firm was less likely 
to invest in a large establishment in markets with many competitors. On the other hand, 
if a new unit has low quality and small size, it is less likely to create additional positive 
externalities but more likely to benefit from the existing positive externalities. Then, a 
new unit with low quality and small size will locate closely to incumbents of high 
quality to benefit from the spillover of positive externalities. Following this logic, 
Kalnins and Chung (2004) found that branded economy hotels were more likely to be 
established in markets with many incumbent branded upscale hotels. 
Given that high quality and large size are attributes of contributors and low 
quality and small size are attributes of beneficiaries, I expect that a multi-unit firm will 
establish a new unit even closer to its incumbent units (i.e., intra-firm agglomeration) 
than to competitors (i.e., inter-agglomeration) if the new unit is perceived as a 
contributor relative to a beneficiary.  
If a multi-unit firm establishes a new unit with high quality and large size close 
to competitors (i.e., inter-agglomeration), the firm may gain little from co-location with 
the competitors but rather strengthen its competitors. Thus, the new establishment with 
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high quality and large size has no incentive to locate close to competitors. However, a 
multi-unit firm will establish a new unit close to a competitor if the new unit is 
perceived as a beneficiary. In this case, a multi-unit firm may gain much from positive 
externalities created by competitors without strengthening the competitors. Taken 
together, a multi-unit firm may establish a new unit farther from competitors as the new 
establishment’s quality and size are higher and larger.  
On the other hand, if a new unit is perceived as a contributor relative to a 
beneficiary, a multi-unit firm will establish the new unit close to its other units (i.e., 
intra-firm agglomeration) for the following two reasons. First, when a new unit of a 
multi-unit firm is more likely a contributor, its incumbent units can mostly benefit from 
positive externalities created by the new establishment. In addition, if its incumbent 
units capture most of the positive externalities, it may reduce a potential spillover of the 
positive externalities into competitors. In contrast, when a new unit is more likely a 
beneficiary, it may not create positive externalities for other units. Instead, it tends to 
benefit from the existing positive externalities created by incumbent units. Put 
differently, almost the same amount of the positive externalities may be distributed to 
one more new units as to incumbent units. Second, although a new establishment can 
induce localized competition between adjacent units (i.e., intra-firm competition) as a 
negative externality, a multi-unit firm can coordinate competitive activities effectively to 
protect its units from negative externalities through formal coordination. This argument 
doesn’t mean that a new establishment will not increase localized competition at all. 
Instead, it means that a multi-unit firm has more capacity to reduce localized 
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competition between its units. I expect the protection effects from localized competition 
are similar whether a new unit is a contributor or a beneficiary. 
Taken together, I expect that a new establishment’s quality and size moderate the 
geographic distances between intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration. Incumbent units 
will benefit more from a new establishment if a new unit is more likely a contributor 
(i.e., high quality and large size) than a beneficiary (i.e., low quality and small size). On 
the other hand, if a new unit is more likely a beneficiary, incumbent units will not 
benefit from the new establishment much but just face more localized competition. This 
implies that a multi-unit firm may establish a new unit even closer to its incumbent units 
(i.e., intra-firm agglomeration) than to competitors (i.e., inter-firm agglomeration) as the 
new establishment’s quality and size are higher and larger. This location decision allows 
its incumbents units to capture much positive externalities created by the new 
establishment, but also minimizes potential spillovers of the positive externalities into 
competitors.  
Hypothesis 2: A new establishment’s quality negatively moderates the relationship 
(H1) such that a multi-unit firm will establish a new unit even closer 
to its incumbent units than to competitors, as the new establishment’s 
quality is higher. 
Hypothesis 3: A new establishment’s size negatively moderates the relationship (H1) 
such that a multi-unit firm will establish a new unit even closer to its 
incumbent units than to competitors, as the new establishment’s size is 
larger. 
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Governance Structure: Franchised vs. Direct Operation 
 A multi-unit firm tends to face the task of choosing a governance structure 
(either direct operation or franchising) for multiple units. Previous studies have shown 
that this governance structure is one potential factor in location decisions (Perryman & 
Combs, 2012). Thus, I further consider the governance structure as a contingency in the 
difference of geographic distances between intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration.  
 Direct operation and franchising are two types of governance structures a multi-
unit firm can choose. Some firms heavily rely on one of the two, but others use both 
types together in similar proportions (Bradach, 1997; Moon & Sharma, 2014). One of 
the theoretical approaches that previous studies have used to describe why a multi-unit 
firm prefers one to another is agency theory (Combs & Ketchen, 2003; Kaufmann & 
Dant, 1996; Perryman & Combs, 2012; Yin & Zajac, 2004). A multi-unit firm is likely 
to face agency costs when a unit is directly operated. A multi-unit firm usually hires a 
manager for its units that are directly operated, and then the agency relationship between 
a firm and a unit manager by nature occurs for directly operated units (Yin & Zajac, 
2004). To protect a multi-unit firm from a unit manager’s opportunistic behaviors, a firm 
needs to monitor the unit manager, consequently increasing monitoring costs (Perryman 
& Combs, 2012; Yin & Zajac, 2004). On the other hand, this type of agency problem 
cannot happen in franchised units. When a multi-unit firm chooses franchising as a 
governance structure, each unit is owned and operated by the same franchisee. Instead, a 
multi-unit firm usually gains royalty fees that are based on revenues of franchised units 
(Yin & Zajac, 2004). Because a franchisee as an owner will try to do his or her best to 
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maximize a unit profitability, franchising can be a potential solution for agency problem 
between a multi-unit firm and its unit managers (Kaufmann & Dant, 1996).  
 When a multi-unit firm establishes a new unit near its incumbent units (i.e., 
intra-firm agglomeration), agency costs are likely to influence its location decisions. A 
multi-unit firm may want to establish new units close to its incumbent units, so it can 
reduce monitoring costs for directly operated units (Perryman & Combs, 2012). First, it 
can reduce investigation costs when a new unit is close to other units. Because multiple 
units co-locate closely in geographic markets, it can pay more attention to those units 
than to isolated units. Furthermore, if necessary, it can send inspectors to monitor the co-
located units’ operation at the same time. Thus, it can save investigation costs by 
sending a few common inspectors to the co-located units rather than separate inspectors 
to each unit. Second, although a multi-unit firm doesn’t send inspectors directly, it can 
use other co-located units’ operation information as a benchmark to monitor the co-
located units. When multiple units co-locate closely, they usually follow similar 
operation patterns (e.g., operating costs, revenues, etc.). If one of the co-located units 
has operation information that deviates from other units, it can signal a potential agency 
problem to the multi-unit firm (Yin & Zajac, 2004). Thus, close co-location with other 
units can provide better information to protect a multi-unit firm from the potential 
agency problem in advance. On the other hand, franchised units are relatively free from 
this type of agency problem between a multi-unit firm and a unit manager, because 
franchisees as owners operate franchised units to maximize their profits. Following this 
logic, it is expected that a multi-unit firm is willing to establish a new unit relatively 
closer to its other units if it is directly owned than if it is franchised.  
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 In addition to the benefit of reducing monitoring costs, for intra-firm 
agglomeration, direct operation may also provide better appropriation capabilities from 
positive externalities and protection capabilities from negative externalities through 
formal cooperation and coordination. First, formal cooperation generates fewer benefits 
from positive externalities for franchised units than for directly operated units. Although 
franchising solves the agency problem between a multi-unit firm and a unit manager, it 
may create another type of agency problem between a multi-unit firm and a franchisee. 
A multi-unit firm may put more priority on firm-level performance than a franchisee 
does on unit-level performance. To maximize positive externalities between units, a 
multi-unit firm may locate a new unit close to other units. However, if a new unit is 
franchised, a franchisee may not want to do so when it strengthens other units but 
doesn’t benefit from other units. In this case, a franchisee has no incentive to cooperate 
with other units to maximize firm-level (i.e., franchisor) performance by sacrificing its 
own unit-level (i.e., franchisee) performance. Furthermore, it is widely assumed that 
franchised units usually have more discretion in strategic decisions (i.e., pricing, new 
innovation adoption, promotion, hiring, etc.) than directly operated units (Michael, 
2002; Yin & Zajac, 2004). Decision-making is relatively centralized for directly 
operated units, so unit managers usually follow guidelines on strategic decisions from 
headquarters (Yin & Zajac, 2004). In contrast, decision-making is relatively 
decentralized for franchised units, so franchisors often do not need approval from 
franchisees to coordinate the strategic decisions of franchised units (Yin & Zajac, 2004). 
In addition, unlike the formal coordination of directly operated units, the formal 
coordination of key operational activities (e.g., price, quality, and advertising) of 
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franchised units by franchisors is often considered to be a violation of antitrust law 
(Michael, 2002). Given the separation of interests between a franchisor and franchisees, 
the less concentrated decision-making and the potential antitrust issue of the 
coordination by franchisors, it is possible that franchisees resist participation in formal 
cooperation to maximize firm-level (franchisor) performance if it requires a sacrifice of 
the franchised unit’s performance. 
Second, similarly, formal coordination of intra-firm competition is weaker for 
franchised units than for directly operated units. As I argued earlier, a multi-unit firm 
sometimes engages in intra-firm competition between units and formally coordinates the 
competitive activities between units if necessary. However, a franchisee may not want to 
compete with other units or to reduce competition with other units for firm-level (i.e., 
franchisor) performance if it leads to a sacrifice of the franchised unit’s performance. 
Thus, it is possible that a franchisee sometimes resists intra-firm competition or formal 
coordination of competitive activities led by a multi-unit firm (i.e., franchisor).  
 When a multi-unit firm establishes its new unit near competitors (i.e., inter-firm 
agglomeration), I expect that the effect of the governance structure on the location 
decisions of multi-unit firms will differ from intra-firm agglomeration. As I noted 
earlier, if a new unit is directly operated, the agency problem between a multi-unit firm 
and a unit manager arises. However, this type of agency problem may be not associated 
with the location decisions of multi-unit firms, because close distance to competitors are 
not related to reduced monitoring costs.  
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However, if a new unit is franchised, another type of agency problem between a 
multi-unit firm and a franchisee can influence its location decisions. As I described 
above, a multi-unit firm usually receives royalty fees that are based on a franchised 
unit’s revenue (Perryman & Combs, 2012; Yin & Zajac, 2004). Thus, a multi-unit firm 
can maximize its performance as a franchised unit’s revenue increases. However, a 
franchisee may pay more attention to operating performance than to revenue per se. 
Although a franchised unit increases its revenue by taking aggressive competitive 
activities against competitors (e.g., price-cutting, promotion, advertisement, etc.), its 
operating performance can be similar or even decline if operating costs increase as well. 
Thus, a multi-unit firm (i.e., franchisor) may put more priority on a franchised unit’s 
revenue than its operating performance, while a franchisee may be the opposite, placing 
more priority on a franchised unit’s operating performance.  
This misalignment may influence the location decisions of multi-unit firms for 
new establishments. If a new unit is franchised, a multi-unit firm may choose its location 
close to competitors. Intensive inter-firm competition tends to increase a new unit’s 
revenue as well as operating costs because of competitive activities (e.g., price-cutting, 
promotion, advertisement, etc.). While it is not a favorable situation for a franchisee, a 
multi-unit firm still has an incentive to choose the close distance to competitors for 
increased revenues of the new establishment. On the other hand, if a new unit is directly 
owned, a multi-unit firm may choose its location far from competitors. In this case, a 
multi-unit firm also puts its priority relatively on operating performance instead of just 
revenue. The close distance to competitors is more likely to provoke intense 
competition, eventually lowering the new establishment’s operating performance. 
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Last, operational synergy created from intra-firm agglomeration also varies 
across directly operated and franchised units. As I argued earlier, operational synergy 
tends to be created as co-located units of the same multi-unit firm share operational 
activities or resources to increase operational efficiencies. However, these types of 
cooperation are more likely to be promoted between directly operated units than 
franchised units, because they require coordination between units and the preference to 
types of performance is also different between directly operated and franchised units. 
First, formal coordination can be more effectively done between directly operated units 
than franchised units. Sharing operating activities (e.g., co-purchasing) and resources 
(e.g., transportation vehicles and human resources) requires coordination. Multi-unit 
firms usually have more control over operating activities and resources for directly 
operated units than franchised units. While multi-unit firms tend to have ownership of 
assets and resources for directly operated units, franchisees do so for franchised units. 
This control difference allows directly operated units to facilitate more cooperation than 
franchised units. For example, in the hotel industry, hotels of the same multi-unit firm 
often share employees when one unit temporarily needs more labor. In the case of 
directly operated hotels, employees tend to make labor contracts with multi-unit hotel 
firms rather than individual hotels. Thus, directly operated hotels don’t need to pay 
additional labor fees for the shared employees. On the other hand, in case of franchised 
hotels, employees tend to make labor contracts with a specific franchised hotel rather 
than multi-unit hotel firms. Thus, sharing employees between directly-operated hotels 
and franchised hotels is less likely to occur. Second, the preference to types of 
performance is also different between directly operated and franchised units. As I argued 
 56 
 
earlier, multi-unit firms prefer operational performance for directly operated units while 
they prefer revenues for franchised units to get more revenue-based royalty fees.  Thus, 
multi-unit firms have an incentive to save costs for directly operated units by sharing 
operational activities and resources, but they don’t for franchised units because 
operational efficiencies of franchised units are not directly related to revenues. In sum, 
these differences between directly operated and franchised units imply that a multi-unit 
firm is more likely to create operational synergy if a new unit is directly operated rather 
than franchised. To take advantage of operation synergy, a multi-unit firm may want to 
establish a new unit even closer to its own units than competitors if it is directly 
operated than if it is franchised.  
Taken together, I expect that a multi-unit firm will establish a new unit even 
closer to its incumbent units than to competitors if it is directly operated than if it is 
franchised. For intra-firm agglomeration, on one hand, a multi-unit firm will do so to 
reduce monitoring costs created by the type of agency problem that commonly emerges 
between a multi-unit firm and a unit manager. On the other hand, a multi-unit firm also 
will do so because directly operated units can lead to more appropriation and protection 
capabilities than franchised units. For inter-firm agglomeration, in contrast to a directly 
operated unit, a franchised unit tends to create a conflict of interest to the types of 
performance (i.e., revenue vs. operating performance) between a multi-unit firm and a 
franchisee. In addition, when a new unit is directly operated rather than franchised, 
operational synergy from intra-firm agglomeration is more likely to be created. 
Therefore, a multi-unit firm has more incentive to choose the new establishment’s 
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location closer to its incumbents than to competitors when it is directly operated than 
when it is franchised. 
Hypothesis 4: A new unit’s governance structure moderates the relationship (H1) such 
that a multi-unit firm will establish a new unit even closer to its 
incumbent units than to competitors, if the new unit is directly operated 
rather than franchised.  
Summary 
 In this chapter, I developed a research hypothesis (i.e., Hypothesis 1) to test the 
difference of geographic distances between intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration in 
the research context in which multi-unit firms establish new units near their own units 
and competitors’ units. If the balance between positive and negative externalities 
captured by multi-unit firms in an agglomeration area tilts more toward positive 
externalities for intra-firm agglomeration than for inter-firm agglomeration, I expect that 
multi-unit firms establish their new units closer to their own units than to competitors.  
 In addition, I investigated a new unit’s quality, size, and governance structure as 
potential contingencies in the difference of geographic distances between intra-firm and 
inter-firm agglomeration. First, previous studies in agglomeration research argued that if 
new established units are perceived as contributors (i.e., high quality and large size), 
firms are less likely to enter agglomerated areas because the new units just strengthen 
competitors without capturing agglomeration benefits. However, I also argue that this is 
not the case for intra-firm agglomeration. Multi-unit firms may establish their new units 
closer to their own units because their units can capture most of positive externalities 
newly created by the new units, if they are more likely contributors than beneficiaries. 
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Taken together, I argue that multi-unit firms establish new units closer to their 
incumbent units (i.e., intra-firm agglomeration) than to competitors (i.e., inter-firm 
agglomeration) if the new units are more likely contributors than beneficiaries. Second, 
previous studies in agglomeration research and franchising research suggests that firms 
establish new units closer to their own units to reduce monitoring costs if the new units 
are directly operated than if they are franchised. However, I suggest that this is not the 
case for inter-firm agglomeration because a conflict of interests to the types of 
performance (i.e., firm-level performance vs. unit-level performance and revenue vs. 
operating performance) between a multi-unit firm and a franchisee can emerge. Taken 
together, I suggest that multi-unit firms establish new units closer to their own units (i.e., 
intra-firm agglomeration) than to competitors (i.e., inter-firm agglomeration) if they are 
directly operated than if they are franchised.  
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Empirical Setting: The U.S. Hotel Industry 
 I chose the U.S. hotel industry as a research context to test the hypotheses. The 
U.S. hotel industry provides some advantages to study intra-firm and inter-firm 
agglomeration. First, there are large multi-unit hotel firms, and intra-firm and inter-firm 
agglomeration are popular phenomena. Large multi-unit hotel firms usually operate 
multiple hotels or have multiple hotel chain brands across geographic markets. Multiple 
hotel chain brands usually target different product segments (e.g., luxury, upper upscale, 
upscale, upper midscale, midscale, and economy class), and each chain brand also has 
multiple establishments across geographic markets. Thus, intra-firm agglomeration can 
occur not only between chain brands but also within each chain brand of a multi-unit 
hotel firm. For instance, 22 hotels of Wyndham Worldwide (hereafter Wyndham) were 
co-located in Sandy Springs-Roswell area of Atlanta in Georgia in 2010.2 Those 22 
hotels belonged to 8 different hotel chain brands of Wyndham (i.e., Days Inn, Howard 
Johnson, Microtell Inn & Suites, Ramada, Super 8, Travelodge, Wingate by Wyndham 
and Wyndham), and the maximum number of hotels by chain brand was 6 by Days Inn. 
Two hotels of the 22 actually located on the same property, and the next closest distance 
between two hotels was just 0.1 km. The average distance between a focal hotel and the 
next closest hotel was 2.3 km.  
                                                 
2 This data came from the STR census data in 2010. STR uses its own definition of geographic markets, 
called tracts. Sandy Springs-Roswell is also one of the STR tracts, and the number of hotels in the area 
was computed according to this information.  
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Second, the U.S. hotel industry also provides a proper setting to compare the 
traditional concept of agglomeration with intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration. Many 
studies have chosen the U.S. hotel industry as a research context to study agglomeration 
(Baum & Haveman, 1997; Baum & Mezias, 1992; Canina et al., 2005; Kalnins & 
Chung, 2004; McCann & Vroom, 2010). However, prior research has not disentangled 
intra-firm agglomeration from inter-firm agglomeration. Thus, previous findings in this 
industry can be confounded by the competing effects of intra-firm and inter-firm 
agglomeration. Using the same research context, I can clarify the differences between 
the two types of agglomeration. 
Third, large multi-unit hotel firms mostly rely on the two types of governance 
structures (i.e., franchising and direct operation) at different levels. For instance, 
Extended Stay Hotels mostly relies on direct operation for the governance structure of 
its units (e.g., chain management), but Choice Hotel International mostly relies on 
franchising. On the other hand, Marriott International uses both types of governance 
structures. This firm-level heterogeneity in terms of the governance structure provides a 
proper setting to test the effect of the governance structure on the location decisions of 
multi-unit firms. 
Data and Samples 
 The major data source in my dissertation is Smith Travel Research (STR). STR is 
a private firm that collects hotel information across the world. STR data cover over 98% 
of U.S. hotels (Canina et al., 2005). Thus, STR data are likely to include almost the entire 
population of large multi-unit hotel firms that are research subjects of my dissertation. 
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STR provides each hotel’s historical census data since 1990, which includes the 
establishment date, closed date, room size, product segment (i.e., class), parent company, 
chain affiliation, governance structure, and address. I used STR year-end historical 
census data to study location decisions of major U.S. multi-unit hotel firms between 1990 
and 2013. A new establishment can be observed by comparing the hotel information 
between adjacent two years, so the data range actually used for my dissertation is 23 
years from 1991 to 2013.  
 I chose 20 major U.S. cities among the entire population of U.S. cities for my 
dissertation. Because STR allowed me to access to its historical census data only for 20 
major U.S. cities, I used a statistical approach to choose the 20 U.S. cities as a 
representative of the entire population. First, I matched the STR market list with the U.S. 
census city list. This match allowed me to identify the city list I can choose for samples. 
Second, among the matched cities, I computed average population growth rate per city 
between 2000 and 2010 by using U.S. census population data. Because my dissertation 
aims to study location decisions of multi-unit firms, samples must include new hotel 
establishments. I used population growth rate as an indicator of hotel demand growth. I 
assumed that as population growth rate is higher, more new hotels are established in a 
focal market. Third, I chose 20 U.S. cities using following criteria: 1) isolated cities 
rather than metropolitan cities to exclude potential city-level location advantages that 
attract new hotel establishments, 2) exclusion of cities that experienced external shocks 
(e.g., Hurricane Katrina at New Orleans) and 3) balance between high and low levels of 
population growth rates.  
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Table 2. 20 Cities for Samples 
City Name State Name Average Population  
Average 
Population 
Growth Rate  
Detroit Michigan 832,611 -24.8% 
Cleveland Ohio 434,551 -16.7% 
Memphis Tennessee 666,939 -5.9% 
Minneapolis Minnesota 380,202 0.1% 
Omaha Nebraska 406,683 0.4% 
Atlanta Georgia 409,447 1.1% 
Kansas City Missouri 449,563 4.2% 
Indianapolis Indiana 798,010 5.0% 
Tucson Arizona 505,516 7.1% 
Louisville Kentucky 573,426 7.9% 
Columbus Ohio 748,634 10.3% 
Nashville  Tennessee 569,293 10.3% 
Portland Oregon 550,396 10.6% 
Jacksonville Florida 784,304 11.9% 
Sacramento California 444,798 14.4% 
Oklahoma City Oklahoma 540,864 14.8% 
Colorado Springs Colorado 388,287 15.9% 
Austin Texas 724,717 17.7% 
Albuquerque New Mexico 500,483 21.3% 
Charlotte North Carolina 653,243 27.1% 
Note: Average population and average population growth rate per city were computed between 
2000 and 2010 by using U.S. census population estimate data. 
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I ran a Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test to check whether the chosen 20 U.S. cities are 
statistically different from major 1,000 U.S. cities. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
showed that the chosen 20 cities are not statistically different from major 1,000 cities in 
terms of population growth rates. Average population growth rate of the chosen 20 cities 
is 6.64%, with a maximum of 27.14% and a minimum of -24.77%. Table 2 lists the 20 
cities with average population and average population growth rates between 2000 and 
2010.  
 Because my dissertation focuses on the location decisions of multi-unit firms in 
terms of intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration, I selected large multi-unit hotel firms as 
the focus of my study. I chose 10 large nationwide multi-unit hotel firms that have 
multiple chain brands across the 20 city markets. Table 3 shows these 10 large multi-unit 
hotel firms and their chain brands. These 10 multi-unit hotel firms account for 
approximately 50% of U.S. hotel observations (53,213 out of 107,174 observations) 
across the 20 U.S. cities between 1991 and 2013 in the samples. In addition, the total 
number of new hotel establishments was 2,918, and of them the 10 multi-unit hotel firms 
established 2,029 new hotels in the sample. Thus, approximately 70% of the total number 
of new hotel establishments were done by these 10 multi-unit hotel firms in the sample. 
Therefore, I use the 2,029 new hotel establishments by these 10 multi-unit hotel firms as 
a final sample to test the hypotheses. 
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Table 3. List of Large Multi-Unit Hotel Firms in Samples 
Multi-Unit Hotel Firm Chain Brands  
Best Western Company Best Western 
Best Western Plus 
Best Western Premier 
Carlson Hospitality 
Company 
Country Inn & Suites 
Park Plaza 
Radisson 
Choice Hotels 
International 
Ascend Collection 
Cambria Suites 
Clarion 
Comfort Inn 
Comfort Suites 
Econo Lodge 
MainStay Suites 
Quality Inn 
Rodeway Inn 
Sleep Inn 
Suburban Extended Stay 
Extended Stay Hotels Crossland Economy 
Studios 
Extended Stay America 
G6 Hospitality Motel 6 Studio 6 
Hilton Worldwide Conrad 
DoubleTree 
Embassy Suites 
Hampton Inn 
Hampton Inn & Suites 
Hilton 
Hilton Garden Inn 
Home2 Suites 
Homewood Suites 
Intercontinental Hotels 
Group 
Candlewood Suites 
Crowne Plaza 
Holiday Inn 
Holiday Inn Express 
Hotel Indigo 
InterContinental 
Staybridge Suites 
LQ Management LLC La Quinta Inns & 
Suites 
 
Marriott International Autograph Collection 
Courtyard 
Fairfield Inn 
Gaylord 
J. W. Marriott 
Marriott 
Marriott Conference 
Center 
Renaissance 
Residence Inn 
Ritz-Carlton 
Springhill Suites 
TownePlace Suites 
Wyndham Worldwide Baymont 
Days Inn 
Hawthorn Suites by 
Wyndham 
Howard Johnson 
Knights Inn 
Microtel Inn & Suites 
by Wyndham 
Ramada 
Ramada Plaza 
Shell Vacations Club 
Super 8 
Travelodge 
Wingate by Wyndham 
Wyndham 
Wyndham Garden Hotel 
Wyndham Vacation Resort 
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Dependent Variable 
I use the geographic distance of a new establishment to incumbents as the 
dependent variable. I measure it by an average geographic distance (km) from a new 
establishment to adjacent incumbents within a certain range. This distance-based 
agglomeration measure has been recommended as an alternative to administrative 
sovereignty- or statistics-based agglomeration measures (i.e., U.S. states, U.S. 
metropolitan statistics areas, U.S. census divisions, or U.S. zip codes) (McCann & Folta, 
2008). However, it is also important to decide the distance range at which the 
agglomeration externalities extend from a new establishment. To do so, I reviewed 
previous agglomeration studies using the hotel industry as a research context. According 
to Baum and Mezias (1992), I decided to use multiple distance ranges for the robustness 
check rather than only one distance range. Baum and Mezias (1992) used 3 avenues or 
25 streets from a new establishment as the distance range of agglomeration in the 
Manhattan hotel industry, but they also used several alternative distances for robustness 
checks. Similarly, I first computed average geographic distance from a new 
establishment to incumbent hotels within 5 km (approximately 3 avenues if one avenue 
is assumed as 1 mile or 1.7 km). I also check the robustness of my results by using 3 km 
as an alternative distance range. 
To compute geographic distance, I used longitude and latitude information of 
each hotel in the STR census data. By using longitude and latitude information between 
a new establishment and an incumbent, I computed the shortest line between two hotels 
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and then averaged it for the dependent variable.3 Average geographic distance was 
separately measured for intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration.  
Independent Variables 
Dummy for Intra-Firm Agglomeration 
For hypothesis 1, I used a dummy variable for intra-firm agglomeration.  If co-
located hotels within 5 km from a new hotel are competitors, the dummy variable is 0. 
However if they belonged to the same multi-unit firm as a new established hotel, the 
dummy variable is coded as 1.  
Dummy for a New Establishment’s Quality  
For hypothesis 2a and 3a to test the effect of a new establishment’s quality on 
location decisions, I used a dummy variable to capture a new establishment’s quality. 
Previous studies have shown that when a hotel’s class is branded upscale or above, a 
hotel is perceived as more likely a contributor to incumbent hotels (Kalnins & Chung, 
2004). However, if it is lower than branded upscale, it is perceived as more likely a 
beneficiary (Kalnins & Chung, 2004). According to this approach, a dummy variable for 
the new establishment’s quality was coded 1 if a new established hotel class was upscale 
or above (i.e., luxury, upper upscale, and upscale). However, it was coded 0 if a new 
established hotel class was lower than upscale (i.e., upper midscale, midscale, and 
economy). 
A New Establishment’s Size 
For hypothesis 2b and 3b to test the effect of a new establishment’s size on 
location decisions, I use the number of rooms of the new established hotel in the STR 
                                                 
3 I used STATA geodist command to compute the shortest distance between two hotels by using longitude 
and latitude information of each hotel. 
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census data to capture its size. Because I found that the number of rooms is highly 
skewed, I log-transformed this variable. 
Dummy for a Governance Structure 
For hypothesis 4 and 5 to test the effect of a new establishment’s governance 
structure on location decisions, I used a dummy variable for the new establishment’s 
governance structure. If a new established hotel was directly operated by a multi-unit 
firm (i.e., chain management), it was coded as 1. However, if a new established hotel 
was franchised, it was coded as 0.  
Control Variables 
 I use several control variables to exclude alternative explanations on the distance 
decisions of multi-unit firms.  
Economy-Related Variables 
I control for unobservable economy effects by using year dummy variables. 
Customer demand for travel can vary across years. When negative external shocks occur 
in a specific year, customer demand for travel is usually low in that year relative to 
others (Blake & Sinclair, 2003). Then, it is possible that hotel firms establish a new hotel 
far from incumbents to avoid competition.  
I also tried to control for time-varying economic effects. It has been well known 
that customer demand for travel is partially influenced by overall standards of living 
(Graham & Glaister, 2004), population growth, and population age (Metz, 2012). To 
control for these effects, I use U.S. GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in billions of 2015 
dollars, the number of U.S. population in millions, and median age of U.S. population 
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per year. These data come from U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. census data. 
However, these variables unfortunately created multicollinearity among themselves and 
with year dummy variables. Finally, I decided to exclude U.S. GDP, U.S. population and 
U.S. population median age variables to avoid multicollinearity.  
Market-Related Variables 
First, I used city dummy variables to control for city-specific unobservable 
factors. For example, cities can have different regulations with regard to new hotel 
establishments, such as floor area ratio to mitigate congestion (Joshi & Kono, 2009). 
These city-specific regulations can influence geographic distance from a new 
establishment to incumbents. Thus, I compute 19 city dummy variables for 20 city 
markets to control for these factors. Second, to control time-varying city effects, I use 
city population in each year. Some city markets attract more travelers than others, and 
then multi-unit hotel firms are willing to establish a new hotel closer to incumbents in 
city markets with high demand for travel. I try to control for this effect by using city-
level population. I use population (thousand) information of metropolitan statistical area 
in U.S. census database. Third, I use location dummy variables to control for location-
specific characteristics. Multi-unit hotel firms may be unable to find a property to 
establish a new hotel in urban and airport areas but have little difficulty in suburban and 
small town areas. Different location characteristics can influence geographic distance 
from a new establishment to incumbents. STR data places location characteristics into 6 
categories – airport, interstate, resort, small metro or town, suburban and urban areas. I 
compute 5 location dummy variables for the 6 location categories, and the reference 
location area is an urban area.  
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Agglomeration-Related Variables 
I control for the number of hotels in each product segment in each geographic 
market for the following two reasons. Kalnins and Chung (2004) showed that the 
agglomeration effect is specific to each product segment of hotels (e.g., economy, 
midscale, upper-midscale, upscale, upper-upscale and luxury). As more hotels with high 
quality (e.g., upscale or luxury hotels) exist in a certain location, a new hotel is more 
likely to enter this location to benefit from agglomeration externalities. In turn, as more 
hotels are present near a new established hotel, average distances to them are shorter. On 
the other hand, the number of hotels in each product segment represents potential market 
opportunity. If there are a few hotels in a certain product segment, multi-unit hotel firms 
may have opportunities to serve customers in this segment by establishing new hotels. 
To control for these effects, I compute the number of hotels in each product segment in 
each geographic market. I use STR hotel class information as product segments and 
STR market tract information as boundaries of agglomeration in the STR census data. 
STR defines market tract as geographic markets. For instance, there are 93 market tracts 
in 20 cities in this dissertation’s sample. Previous studies also used STR market tract as 
boundaries of agglomeration (Canina et al., 2005). According to STR hotel class 
information (i.e., economy, midscale, upper-midscale, upscale, upper-upscale and 
luxury), I used six variables for the number of hotels in each product segment per 
market tract.  
I also tried to control for ownership-based agglomeration. Previous studies show 
that geographic co-location also is affected by ownership such as multi-outlet ownership 
in which a single franchisee has multiple franchised units in the same market (Kalnins & 
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Lafontaine, 2004; Kaufmann & Dant, 1996; Perryman & Combs, 2012). However, I 
found that there are no hotels owned by the same franchisee in the same cities in the 
STR census data. Therefore, I conclude that the ownership-based agglomeration is not a 
threat to my dissertation’s model as an omitted variable. 
Firm-Related Variable 
Multi-unit hotel firms often have multiple hotel chain brands. For example, 
Marriot International has 12 chain brands (e.g., Courtyard, Fairfield Inn Marriott, 
Springhill Suites, TownePlace Suites, etc.) and Wyndham Worldwide has 15 (Days Inn, 
Ramada, Hawthorn Suites, Howard Johnson, Super 8, Travelodge, etc.) in my 
dissertation’s sample. Hotels of the same chain brand tend to serve customers in the 
same product segment. Thus, if multi-unit hotel firms already have a certain chain-brand 
hotels in a geographic market, they are less willing to establish a new hotel with the 
same chain brand to avoid potential competition with the incumbent. To control for this 
effect, I compute the number of same brand hotels of a multi-unit hotel firm in each STR 
market tract.  
Establishment-Related Variables 
Product differentiation has been considered to be a potential factor to influence 
geographic distances to incumbents (Baum & Haveman, 1997; Freedman & Kosová, 
2012). Following Baum and Haveman (1997), I used price and size distance to control for 
this effect, based on Euclidean distances. STR assigns one of five price segments to each 
hotel (i.e., budget, economy, midscale, upscale, and luxury). Similarly, I assign a 5-point 
Likert scale to STR price segments (i.e., budget=1, economy=2, midscale=3, upscale=4, 
and luxury=5) and compute price distance of a new establishment to incumbents as 
follows. 
 71 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 =  ��(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 − 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗)2
𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖
 
where Pi is a price segment of a new hotel i, and Pj is a price segment of an incumbent 
within 5 km from a new hotel i. I also compute size distance of a new establishment to 
incumbents as follows.  
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 =  ��(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 − 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗)2
𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖
 
where Si is the number of rooms of a new hotel i, and Sj is the number of rooms of an 
incumbent within 5 km from a new hotel i. 
Main Analysis 
The research context in my dissertation showed that the same multi-unit hotel 
firms established new hotels repeatedly between 1991 and 2013. In this case, Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) can generate biased coefficients because of unobserved firm-
specific heterogeneities in the error term (Wooldridge, 2006). Thus, I will use fixed-
effects models to control for time-invariant unobservable firm heterogeneities. 
Specifically, I computed 9 firm dummy variables for 10 multi-unit hotel firms in the 
sample and include these variables in OLS models, which are equivalent to fixed-effects 
models.  
Supplementary Analyses 
I conducted several supplementary analyses as robustness checks of the main 
analysis. First, I used 3 km as an alternative boundary of agglomeration in the 
supplementary analysis. From my review of the agglomeration literature, I found that 5 
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km (or approximately 3 miles) has been used as a boundary of agglomeration in the hotel 
industry setting. While the 5 km boundary is proper to represent the extent to which 
agglomeration externalities (either positive or negative) extend in rural or suburban areas, 
it is possible that it is relatively wide for urban areas. To consider this possibility, I 
computed the average distances from a new hotel to incumbents within 3 km as an 
alternative dependent variable. I also measured price and size distance by using the 3 km 
boundary as control variables. 
Second, I checked for the possibility that the distance difference between intra-
firm and inter-firm agglomeration cancels out when an average distance is used for the 
dependent variable. It is possible that geographic distances for intra-firm and inter-firm 
agglomeration have similar average values but different distributions within boundaries 
of agglomeration. In this case, the average distances as the dependent variable may not 
capture this difference. Thus, I used a dyadic geographic distance between a new hotel 
and an incumbent as the dependent variable instead of an average geographic distance.  
Third, I used the Tobit model for a robustness check. The dependent variable in 
my dissertation is an average geographic distance from a new established hotel to 
incumbents within a 5 km as a boundary of agglomeration. Thus, geographic distances 
are strictly positive values, but also can be zero. For instance, some hotels often have the 
same address in the STR census data. I checked the cases of hotels having the same 
address from a STR hotel expert, confirming that hotels often operate in the same 
property or building. Thus, if the STR census data show hotels of the same address, it 
means that a geographic distance between hotels is zero. When a nontrivial fraction of 
geographic distances is zero, OLS can estimate negative predicted values for an average 
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geographic distance that is actually strictly positive (Wooldridge, 2006). To consider this 
censoring problem, I use Tobit models including the same variables of the main OLS 
fixed-effects models (Maddala, 1987).  
 Fourth, I checked for a potential sample selection bias in my dissertation’s model. 
Sample selection is one of sources to result in endogeneity (Certo, Busenbark, Woo, & 
Semadeni, 2016; Heckman, 1979; Wooldridge, 2006). In my dissertation’s model, an 
average geographic distance of a new hotel to incumbents as the dependent variable is 
observable only after the new hotel is established. In other words, it is possible that a 
hotel firm decides whether to establish a new hotel in a certain geographic market first 
and then that it decides a specific location of a new hotel (i.e., geographic distances of a 
new hotel to incumbents). In this case, a new hotel establishment decision can be 
considered to be the first stage model, and a geographic distance decision can be the 
second stage model. If the independent variables influencing a geographic distance 
decision of a new hotel (i.e., the second stage model) also influence a hotel establishment 
decision (i.e., the first stage model), sample selection bias can exist (Certo et al., 2016; 
Wooldridge, 2010). To consider the potential sample selection bias in my dissertation’s 
model, I use a Heckman two-stage model (Heckman, 1979). The first stage model is the 
new hotel establishment decisions of a multi-unit hotel firm in geographic markets. I 
measured whether each multi-unit hotel firm established new hotels in each STR market 
tract in each year. I coded 1 if a multi-unit hotel firm established new hotels in each STR 
market in each year, and 0 if not. There are 93 STR market tract and 10 multi-unit hotel 
firms between 1991 and 2013 (23 years) in the sample, so the total observation for the 
first stage model is 21,390. I used a probit model for the first stage model using the 
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independent variables of the second stage model as well as two exclusion restrictions – 
the number of hotel failures and the number of hotels of a multi-unit hotel firm in a 
geographic market. If many hotels are close in a geographic market, it shows that the 
market is not attractive for establishing a new hotel. Thus, I computed the number of 
closed hotels in each STR market tract in each year. In addition, as a multi-unit hotel firm 
already has more hotels in a geographic market, it is more likely to establish a new hotel 
because it understands the market and benefits from intra-firm agglomeration. 
Accordingly, I also computed the number of hotels of each multi-unit hotel firm in each 
STR market tract in each year. Using estimates of the first stage probit model, I computed 
the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) and include it to the second stage OLS fixed-effects model 
(Heckman, 1979). Because the second stage model tends to suffer from 
heteroskedasticity when IMR is included (Wooldridge, 2010), I used Huber-White 
standard errors to correct for potential heteroscedasticity. 
Summary 
 This chapter describes research methods to test the hypotheses developed in 
Chapter 4. I provided the reasons for choosing the U.S. hotel industry as the research 
context and the procedure for selecting 20 major U.S. cities from the STR (data 
provider) database. I also introduced variables, their measurements, main analysis and 
supplementary analyses for testing the hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Appendix A reports descriptive statistics of the sample for the main analysis, 
including mean values, minimum values, maximum values, and correlation coefficients 
for all the variables. I initially found a total of 2,081 new hotel establishments, but I 
finally used 1,290 of them because of missing values of the independent variables and no 
incumbent hotels within a 5 km from the new hotel. Because I computed an average 
geographic distance from a new hotel to incumbent competitors and the same parent 
firm’s hotels separately, there is a total of 1,680 observations for the main analysis.  
I checked for potential multicollinearity in the sample. All correlation 
coefficients are lower than 0.6. I also checked variance inflation factors (VIFs) between 
variables in the sample by using the OLS model. The OLS model includes an average 
geographic distance as the dependent variable and all independent and control variables, 
but excludes year dummy, city dummy, firm dummy, and interaction variables because 
they tend to create multicollinearity among themselves. The average VIF value is 1.83, 
the minimum 1.05, and the maximum 3.91. Therefore, I concluded that multicollinearity 
is not a serious threat to the sample. 
Main Analysis 
 Appendix B reports the results of fixed-effects OLS models as a main analysis. 
Model 1 includes only control variables, and Model 2 adds the dummy for intra-firm 
agglomeration as a main independent variable to test the Hypothesis 1. Model 3-5 
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includes additional interaction variables with a new hotel’s quality, size and governance 
structure (i.e., the dummy for a franchised hotel) to test Hypotheses 2-4 respectively. All 
models include 22 year dummies for 23 years, 19 city dummies for 20 cities, and 9 
parent firm dummy variables for the 10 multi-unit hotel firms in the sample. Therefore, 
these OLS models are equivalent to fixed-effects models that control for unobservable 
firm, city, and year heterogeneities. 
 The effects of control variables are as I expected, and their directions and 
statistical significances are relatively consistent across Models 1-5. First, I found 
significant effects of location characteristics on average geographic distance. Multi-unit 
hotel firms established new units closer to incumbents in interstate areas (e.g., highway 
ramps) than in urban areas, but farther in suburban areas than in urban areas. This result 
is consistent with Chung and Kalnins’s (2001) finding that agglomeration externalities 
are different between rural and urban areas. Second, the number of hotels in product 
segments has a significant effect on average geographic distance. As the number of hotels 
especially in upscale and economy segments increase, new units tend to be established 
farther from incumbents. These results show that multi-unit hotel firms try to avoid 
competition by establishing a new hotel far away from incumbents. Third, I find that 
price distance has a positive effect, while size distance doesn’t have a significant effect 
on average geographic distance. Baum and Haveman (1997) found that when hotel firms 
decided price and size dimensions of new hotels in Manhattan, they tried to differentiate 
the new hotels by size but not by price. Unlike Baum and Haveman (1997), I find that 
new hotels were differentiated by price not by size in my sample.  
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 Hypothesis 1 is supported. In Model 2, the dummy for intra-firm agglomeration 
has a negative effect on average geographic distance (β=-1.032; p<.001). This means that 
a multi-unit hotel firm establishes new units, on average, 1.032 km closer to its own 
hotels than to competitors. When I computed the predicted geographic distance of a new 
unit in Model 2, it is 2.097 km from competitors but 1.065 km from units of the same 
parent firm. Because I used 5 km as a boundary of agglomeration, 1 km distance 
difference on average between intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration is considered to be 
the strong effect.  
 Hypothesis 2 is supported. In Model 3, there is the negative moderation effect of a 
new unit’s quality (β=-0.275; p<.01). Figure 3 shows this moderation effect. In Figure 3, 
compared with midscale and economy hotels (i.e., low quality hotels), upscale and luxury 
hotels (i.e. high quality hotels) are likely to be established closer to a parent hotel firm’s 
own units than to competitors in my dissertation sample. When a new unit’s quality is 
lower than upscale, its distances both to its parent firm’s own other and competitors are 
over than 2 km and very close (2.12 km and 2.06 km respectively). However, when a new 
unit’s quality is upscale or above, its distance to its parent firm’s units is even shorter than 
1 km (0.87 km), but to competitors is over than 1 km (1.21 km). Therefore, the distance 
difference between intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration becomes wider as a new 
unit’s quality increases.  
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Figure 3. Moderation Effect of a New Hotel’s Quality (DV: Average Distance) 
 
 
Figure 4. Moderation Effect of a New Hotel’s Size (DV: Average Distance)  
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Hypothesis 3 is also supported. In Model 4, there is a significant negative 
moderation effect of a new unit’s size (β=-0.181; p<.1). Because a new unit’s size is log-
transformed, the coefficient can be interpreted as the percentage effect. Compared with a 
distance to competitors, it is 0.181 km closer to hotels of the same parent firm as the new 
unit’s size (i.e., the number of rooms) increases by 1 percent. Figure 4 shows this 
moderation effect of a new unit’s size.  
However, Hypothesis 4 is not supported. In Model 5, the moderation effect of a 
new franchised unit is positive but not statistically significant (β=0.033). Therefore, I 
cannot find statistical evidence that whether a multi-unit hotel firm establishes a new unit 
farther from its own hotels than to competitors if it is franchised rather than directly 
operated. One potential reason is that there is relatively small variation in a dummy for a 
new franchised unit. In Appendix A, the mean value of a dummy for a new franchised 
unit is 0.9. Multi-unit hotel firms have chosen a growth strategy by building more 
franchised hotels in order to overcome financial resource scarcity, local knowledge, and 
agency problems (Combs et al., 2004; Michael, 1996; Perryman & Combs, 2012; Weaven 
& Frazer, 2007). In fact, the percent of franchised units of multi-unit hotel firms has 
continued to grow over time in the sample. It was just 18.68% in 1990, but continued to 
grow such that it became 44.24% in 2000, 73.26% in 2010, and 81.48% in 2013 in the 
sample. Therefore, most of new established units were franchised in the sample. 
Supplementary Analysis: Alternative Boundary of Agglomeration (3 km) 
 Appendix C reports the results using 3 km as an alternative boundary of 
agglomeration. I just adjusted the boundary of agglomeration, so the number of 
observations and the OLS model specifications are same as the main analysis.  
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Most of the results are consistent with the main analysis. Hypothesis 1 is 
supported such that the effect of a dummy for intra-firm agglomeration is significantly 
positive (β=-0.464; p<.001) in Model 2. This means that the average distance to hotels of 
the same parent firm is 0.464 km shorter than that to competitors if 3 km is used as an 
alternative boundary of agglomeration. Hypothesis 2 is also supported. The moderation 
effect of a new unit’s quality is significantly negative (β=-0.215; p<.001) in Model 3. 
Hypotheses 3 is not supported. The moderation effect of a new unit’s size is negative, but 
not statistically significant (β=-0.079) in Model 4. Similarly, Hypothesis 4 is not 
supported.  
Supplementary Analysis: Dyadic Distance  
 Appendix D reports the results of the OLS models that use a dyadic distance from 
a new hotel to an individual incumbent hotel within 5 km as the dependent variable, so 
the number of observations increases to 20,254. Except for the dependent variable, 
independent and control variables are same as the main analysis.  
The results of the OLS models are exactly consistent with the main analysis. 
Hypothesis 1 is supported. The effect of a dummy for intra-firm agglomeration is 
significantly negative (β=-0.326; p<.001) in Model 2. Hypotheses 2 and 3 are also 
supported. The moderation effects of a new hotel’s quality (β=-0.359; p<.001) and size 
(β=-0.298; p<.001) are significantly negative in Model 2 and 3 respectively. One 
interesting finding in this supplementary analysis is that the negative moderation effect of 
size becomes stronger in this supplementary analysis. This result shows the possibility 
that the weak moderation effect of a new hotel unit’s size results from using the average 
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Figure 5. Moderation Effect of a New Hotel’s Quality (DV: Dyadic Distance)  
 
 
Figure 6. Moderation Effect of a New Hotel’s Size (DV: Dyadic Distance) 
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distance in the main analysis. Figure 5 and 6 show these negative moderation effects. In 
addition, Hypothesis 4 is not supported as the moderation effect of a dummy for a new 
franchised hotel is positive but not significant (β=0.087). 
Supplementary Analysis: Tobit Model  
 Appendix E reports the results of the Tobit models. In this supplementary 
analysis, I used the Tobit model to control for potential left-censoring because a 
geographic distance from a new hotel to incumbents can be 0 km. The number of 
observations and independent and control variables are same as the main analysis. 
The results of the Tobit models are exactly consistent with the main analysis. 
Because the Tobit model is non-linear, the interpretation of the coefficients is different 
from the OLS model (Wooldridge, 2006). However, the direction of the coefficients 
shows that Hypotheses 1 is supported. The effect of a dummy for intra-firm 
agglomeration is significantly negative (β=-1.033; p<.001) in Model 2. Hypotheses 2 
and 3 are also supported. The moderation effects of a new hotel unit’s quality (β=-0.274; 
p<.01) and size (β=-0.181; p<.05) are significantly negative in Model 3 and 4 
respectively. However, Hypothesis 4 is not still supported such that the moderation 
effect of a dummy for a new franchised hotel is not significant (β=0.034). 
Supplementary Analysis: Sample Selection Model  
 I used a Heckman two-stage model to check for a potential sample selection 
problem. Appendix F shows the results of the first stage probit model using the two 
exclusion restrictions (instruments) – the number of hotel failures and the number of 
hotels of a parent firm. In the first stage probit model, I included only variables of the 
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main analysis that are observable before a new hotel establishment (Wooldridge, 2010). 
Thus, new hotel-related variables (e.g., a new hotel’s quality, size, franchise and intra-
firm agglomeration) cannot be included in the first stage model. The results show that the 
effect of number of hotels of a parent firm is strongly significant (β=0.027; p<.001). I 
compute the IMR using the estimates of the first stage probit model. The correlation 
coefficients between independent variables (i.e., intra-firm agglomeration, a new hotel’s 
quality, size, and franchise) and the IMR are also relative low, ranging from |0.056| to 
|0.216|. Taken together, these results show some evidence that the first stage model has 
relatively strong exclusion restrictions (Certo et al., 2016).  
 Appendix G shows the results of the second stage OLS model including the IMR. 
Although the coefficients of the IMR are significantly negative, the results of the 
Heckman two-stage models are exactly consistent with the main analysis. Hypothesis 1 is 
supported such that the effect of a dummy for intra-firm agglomeration is significantly 
negative (β=-1.055; p<.001) in Model 1. Hypotheses 2 and 3 are also supported, so the 
moderation effects of a new hotel’s quality (β=-0.254; p<.01) and size (β=-0.171; p<.05) 
are significantly negative in Model 2 and 3. However, Hypothesis 4 is not supported in 
Model 4. 
Summary 
 In this chapter, I tested the hypotheses in the main and the supplementary 
analyses. The main analysis was the fixed-effects OLS model controlling for 
unobservable parent firm heterogeneity. I also tried using an alternative boundary of 
agglomeration (i.e. 3 km), a dyadic distance as the dependent variable instead of an 
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average distance, a Tobit analysis for a potential censoring problem, and a Heckman two-
stage analysis for a potential sample selection problem.  
 First, I found that multi-unit hotel firms tended to establish new hotels closer to 
their own hotels than to competitors in the sample. This result is consistent whether I use 
different boundaries of agglomeration (i.e., 5 km or 3km) and different measures of 
geographic distances (i.e., average or dyadic distances). Second, the distance difference 
between intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration becomes wider as a new hotel’s quality 
and size increases. Thus, the geographic distance to hotels of the same parent firm was 
much shorter than that to competitors as a new hotel was upscale or above and had a large 
number of rooms. The empirical evidence on these moderating effects are more salient 
when I used 3 km as a boundary of agglomeration instead of 5 km, dyadic distances as 
the dependent variable, the Tobit model and the Heckman two-stage model in the sample. 
Third, I couldn’t find any empirical evidence that multi-unit firms established new hotels 
much closer to their own hotels than to competitors if they are franchised rather than 
directly operated. This result was not consistently significant in any of the main or 
supplementary analyses. 
In sum, I found that the results of the main analysis and the supplementary 
analyses are consistent. From these consistent empirical evidence, I conclude that the 
results reported in this chapter are robust. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
The key questions of my dissertation are 1) how intra-firm and inter-firm 
agglomeration are different and 2) how these differences influence the location decisions 
of multi-unit firms. I considered the differences between intra-firm and inter-firm 
agglomeration to be one of the potential factors to understand the inconsistent research 
findings in the agglomeration literature – positive operational performance from the 
positive externality perspective and low survival rates from the negative externality 
perspective. I expected that multi-unit firms face varying levels of positive and negative 
externalities in terms of intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration. The balance between 
positive and negative externalities may tilt more toward positive for intra-firm 
agglomeration than for inter-firm agglomeration. In addition, multi-unit firms are more 
likely to enjoy operational synergy from intra-firm agglomeration than from inter-firm 
agglomeration. These differences can influence the location decisions of multi-unit firms 
such that multi-unit firms establish new units closer to their own units than to 
competitors. I also investigated a new unit’s quality, size, and governance structure as 
potential contingencies in the difference of geographic distances between intra-firm and 
inter-firm agglomeration.  
I developed hypotheses to test these differences between intra-firm and inter-firm 
agglomeration and the effects of these differences on the location decisions of multi-unit 
firms. Specifically, I tested the hypotheses in the U.S. hotel industry in which 10 large 
multi-unit hotel firms established new hotels near their own hotels and competitor hotels 
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in 20 major U.S. cities for 23 years (between 1991 and 2013). I found that large multi-
unit hotel firms, in fact, established new hotels closer to their own hotels than to 
competitors and that these distance differences were wider as a new hotel’s quality and 
size increased. In other words, multi-unit hotel firms established new hotels even much 
closer to their own hotels than to competitors as a new hotel’s quality was upscale or 
above and its number of rooms increased. These results remained robust in several 
supplementary analyses. 
Contributions 
My dissertation makes several contributions to the agglomeration literature. 
First, I introduce a new concept of intra-firm agglomeration which is distinct from inter-
firm agglomeration. While previous studies in the agglomeration literature have not 
distinguished between intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration, this distinction is 
important because the two types of agglomeration are compositionally different so that 
they can provide theoretically different implications. For example, each agglomeration 
can have different levels of intra-firm or/and inter-firm agglomeration in terms of 
components of agglomeration. Intra-firm agglomeration can be dominant in one cluster, 
while inter-firm agglomeration can be dominant in another cluster. Because the balance 
between positive and negative externalities and operational synergy effects vary between 
intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration, the traditional concept of agglomeration may 
mislead us about the effect of agglomeration when the researcher fails to consider the 
presence of both types of agglomeration in a cluster.  
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Second, a comparison between intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration can 
provide another reason why the agglomeration literature has resulted in the paradox of 
competing empirical evidence between positive and negative externalities – that is, 
positive operational performance from the positive externality perspective and low 
survival rates from the negative externality perspective. If firms are exposed to varying 
levels of positive and negative externalities resulting from intra-firm and inter-firm 
agglomeration, the two types of agglomeration should be considered to be important 
contingencies in the agglomeration literature. The balance between positive and negative 
externalities can tilt toward positive as intra-firm agglomeration is more dominant in a 
cluster, but the opposite case can happen in another cluster. Put differently, depending on 
different levels of intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration, firms can be exposed to 
either more positive or negative externalities.  
Third, my dissertation shows that the location decisions of multi-unit firms are 
more complex than previous studies have suggested. When multi-unit firms choose their 
new establishment’s location, they should consider geographic distance not only to 
competitors but also to their own business establishments. This situation opens a 
possibility that multi-unit firms strategically choose their establishments’ distances to 
competitors and to their own establishments differently to maximize positive 
externalities and to minimize negative externalities. For example, assuming inter-firm 
agglomeration, Baum and Haveman (1997) found that when hotel firms established new 
hotels close to competitors in Manhattan, they differentiated the new hotels by size but 
not by price in order to benefit from positive externalities but avoid localized 
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competition. My dissertation’s finding shows that intra-firm vs. inter-firm agglomeration 
has strong effects on the location decisions of multi-unit hotel firms beyond and above 
size and price differentiation. Multi-unit hotel firms established new hotels 1 km on 
average closer to their own hotels (i.e., average distance = 1.065 km) than to competitors 
(i.e., average distance = 2.097 km) within 5 km boundary of agglomeration in my 
sample (Model 2 in Appendix B). In addition, R-square increased from 0.161 (Model 1 
in Appendix B) to 0.356 (Model 2 in Appendix B) after including a dummy variable for 
intra-firm agglomeration, suggesting that intra-firm vs. inter-firm agglomeration 
explains more variation of geographic distance decisions of multi-unit firms than all of 
the control variables together (e.g., price and size differentiation). Therefore, my 
dissertation shows that different types of agglomeration are important factors in the 
location decisions of multi-unit firms.  
Limitations and Future Research 
 My dissertation is not perfect and has some limitations, but I believe that they 
can open new opportunities for future research. First, one way to investigate the varying 
balance between positive and negative externalities is to test firm performance directly. 
If the balance tilts more toward positive for intra-firm agglomeration than for inter-firm 
agglomeration, performance of new or incumbent units (e.g., operational performance or 
survival rates) becomes more positive for intra-firm agglomeration than for inter-firm 
agglomeration. Because performance information for individual hotels is not available in 
my sample, my dissertation tested geographic distance differences between intra-firm 
and inter-firm agglomeration as an alternative. Future research may investigate how 
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operational performance or survival performance varies between intra-firm and inter-
firm agglomeration. Specifically, according to my dissertation’s theoretical framework, I 
expect that as intra-firm agglomeration becomes more dominant in a cluster, new or 
incumbent units are likely to have more positive operational performance (e.g., 
revenues) and higher survival rates. If future research provides additional empirical 
evidence on the different effects of intra-firm vs. inter-firm agglomeration on firm 
performance, my dissertation’s theoretical framework can receive more direct support.  
 Second, one unexpected result is that a new hotel’s governance structure (i.e., 
direct operation vs. franchising) had no significant effect on the geographic distance 
difference between intra-firm and inter-firm agglomeration despite of theoretical 
expectation and some anecdotal evidence from an interview with a hotel manager. One 
potential reason is that I considered only a new hotel’s governance structure but not the 
incumbents’ governance structure. It is possible that only when a new hotel and 
incumbents both are directly operated, multi-unit hotel firms tend to establish the new 
hotel closer to their own incumbents. Because I used an average distance from a new 
hotel to incumbents, I couldn’t consider governance structures of incumbents. Thus, 
incumbents could be mixed with directly operated and franchised hotels. In this case, the 
effect of a new hotel’s governance structure can be also contingent on incumbents’ 
governance structure. Another potential reason is that multi-unit hotel firms have 
established mostly franchised hotels rather than directly operated hotels in two decades 
in my sample. In fact, approximately 90% of new established hotels were franchised in 
my sample. Although I included some market and firm-level characteristics as control 
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variables, it is possible that there are some unobservable factors affecting the governance 
structure decisions of multi-unit hotel firms and that my dissertation’s model failed to 
include some influential factors behind the governance structure decision. For example, 
Perryman and Combs (2012) suggested that geographic distance from a new unit to 
headquarters of multi-outlet firms is an important aspect of the governance structure 
decision as it affects monitoring costs. Perryman and Combs (2012) considered multi-
outlet ownership to exist when one franchisee has multiple units linked to the same 
franchisor. Although I did not find any multi-outlet ownership in my sample, this type of 
monitoring cost can be a factor of the governance structure in the hotel industry. In sum, 
future studies need to consider the effect of the match of governance structure on the 
location decisions of multi-unit firms and other potential factors behind the governance 
structure decision. Those studies may help understand why the effect of governance 
structure is not significant on the geographic distance differences between intra-firm and 
inter-firm agglomeration in my sample. 
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Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics 
 Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 
1 Geographic distance (within 5km) 1.8 1.0 0.0 4.2 1.00   
2 City population 2037.3 1305.4 464.8 5522.9 -0.03 1.00  
3 Airport 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 -0.01 -0.03 1.00 
4 Interstate 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 -0.17 0.05 -0.10 
5 Resort 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 -0.01 -0.07 -0.04 
6 Small metro/town 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 
7 Suburban 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.11 0.07 -0.54 
8 Number of luxury hotels 0.5 1.2 0.0 10.0 0.04 -0.01 -0.11 
9 Number of upper upscale hotels 2.8 2.4 0.0 15.0 0.01 0.19 0.08 
10 Number of upscale hotels 5.3 3.8 0.0 28.0 0.08 0.09 0.05 
11 Number of upper midscale hotels 8.6 5.2 0.0 28.0 -0.02 0.16 -0.03 
12 Number of midscale hotels 7.6 4.2 0.0 26.0 0.00 0.15 0.09 
13 Number of economy hotels 25.9 13.6 0.0 75.0 -0.02 0.24 -0.01 
14 Number of same brand hotels 0.6 1.0 0.0 7.0 -0.09 0.12 -0.13 
15 Price distance 5.7 3.0 0.0 18.2 0.23 -0.11 0.24 
16 Size distance 396.2 513.2 0.0 10723.5 0.07 0.06 0.08 
17 Dummy for quality of a new hotel 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 -0.04 0.02 0.05 
18 Size of a new hotel 4.6 0.5 3.3 8.0 0.04 0.05 0.05 
19 Dummy for franchise 0.9 0.3 0.0 1.0 -0.07 -0.09 0.03 
20 Intra-firm agglomeration 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.0 -0.43 -0.01 0.05 
 
 Variable 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
5 Resort -0.03 1.00      
6 Small metro/town -0.03 -0.01 1.00     
7 Suburban -0.34 -0.15 -0.16 1.00    
8 Number of luxury hotels -0.06 0.22 0.00 -0.18 1.00   
9 Number of upper upscale hotels -0.14 0.13 -0.02 -0.32 0.47 1.00  
10 Number of upscale hotels -0.21 0.11 -0.04 0.05 0.30 0.35 1.00 
11 Number of upper midscale hotels 0.03 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.18 0.14 0.47 
12 Number of midscale hotels 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.02 0.09 -0.04 0.21 
13 Number of economy hotels 0.22 0.01 0.05 0.07 -0.02 -0.18 -0.07 
14 Number of same brand hotels 0.23 0.00 0.21 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 
15 Price distance -0.18 -0.07 -0.11 -0.24 0.12 0.20 0.12 
16 Size distance -0.15 0.08 -0.08 -0.34 0.24 0.48 0.11 
17 Dummy for quality of a new hotel -0.15 0.02 -0.09 -0.13 0.13 0.18 0.13 
18 Size of a new hotel -0.21 -0.01 -0.13 -0.20 0.16 0.31 0.20 
19 Dummy for franchise 0.08 0.00 0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 
20 Intra-firm agglomeration -0.07 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 0.02 0.09 0.07 
1. Year dummy, city dummy, and parent firm dummy variables are excluded for the limited space. 
2. The correlation coefficient is statistically significant at 5% of the p-value if the coefficient is larger than 
|0.0486|. 
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Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics (Continued) 
 Variable 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
12 Number of midscale 
hotels 
0.57 1.00        
13 Number of economy 
hotels 
0.44 0.57 1.00       
14 Number of same 
brand hotels 
0.28 0.19 0.28 1.00      
15 Price distance -0.06 0.01 -0.10 -0.25 1.00     
16 Size distance -0.11 -0.21 -0.26 -0.17 0.40 1.00    
17 Dummy for quality 
of a new hotel 
0.03 -0.07 -0.17 -0.20 0.30 0.28 1.00   
18 Size of a new hotel -0.03 -0.15 -0.29 -0.25 0.36 0.58 0.53 1.00  
19 Dummy for 
franchise 
0.13 0.11 0.13 0.11 -0.04 -0.18 -0.05 -0.29 1.00 
20 Intra-firm 
agglomeration 
-0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 0.10 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.06 
1. Year dummy, city dummy, and parent firm dummy variables are excluded for the limited space. 
2. The correlation coefficient is statistically significant at 5% of the p-value if the coefficient is larger than 
|0.0486|. 
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APPENDIX B 
RESULTS OF FIXED-EFFECTS OLS MODEL (DV: AVERAGE DISTANCE WITHIN 
5 KM) 
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Appendix B. Results of Fixed-Effects OLS Model (DV: Average Distance within 5 km) 
 Geographic distance (within 5km) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
City dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
City population 0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Airport -0.054 
(0.106) 
-0.068 
(0.093) 
-0.068 
(0.093) 
-0.074 
(0.093) 
-0.067 
(0.093) 
Interstate -0.340* 
(0.140) 
-0.426*** 
(0.123) 
-0.423*** 
(0.123) 
-0.425*** 
(0.123) 
-0.426*** 
(0.123) 
Resort 0.331 
(0.254) 
0.257 
(0.222) 
0.274 
(0.222) 
0.240 
(0.222) 
0.257 
(0.223) 
Small metro/town 0.041 
(0.223) 
-0.143 
(0.195) 
-0.129 
(0.195) 
-0.129 
(0.195) 
-0.142 
(0.195) 
Suburban 0.228* 
(0.097) 
0.164+ 
(0.085) 
0.162+ 
(0.085) 
0.158+ 
(0.085) 
0.164+ 
(0.085) 
Number of luxury 
hotels 
-0.001 
(0.027) 
-0.023 
(0.023) 
-0.022 
(0.023) 
-0.022 
(0.023) 
-0.023 
(0.023) 
Number of upper 
upscale hotels 
-0.008 
(0.014) 
0.001 
(0.013) 
0.000 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.013) 
0.001 
(0.013) 
Number of upscale 
hotels 
0.026** 
(0.009) 
0.034*** 
(0.008) 
0.033*** 
(0.008) 
0.034*** 
(0.008) 
0.034*** 
(0.008) 
Number of upper 
midscale hotels 
0.006 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
Number of 
midscale hotels 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
Number of 
economy hotels 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.004+ 
(0.002) 
0.004+ 
(0.002) 
0.004+ 
(0.002) 
0.004+ 
(0.002) 
Number of same 
brand hotels 
-0.007 
(0.027) 
-0.015 
(0.024) 
-0.012 
(0.024) 
-0.013 
(0.024) 
-0.015 
(0.024) 
Price distance 0.089*** 
(0.010) 
0.092*** 
(0.009) 
0.092*** 
(0.009) 
0.092*** 
(0.009) 
0.092*** 
(0.009) 
Size distance 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Dummy for quality 
of a new hotel 
-0.215*** 
(0.064) 
-0.146** 
(0.056) 
-0.063 
(0.062) 
-0.147** 
(0.056) 
-0.146** 
(0.056) 
Size of a new hotel 0.028 
(0.082) 
0.063 
(0.072) 
0.064 
(0.072) 
0.119 
(0.077) 
0.063 
(0.072) 
Dummy for 
franchise 
-0.112 
(0.102) 
-0.106 
(0.090) 
-0.111 
(0.090) 
-0.107 
(0.090) 
-0.115 
(0.102) 
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Intra-firm 
agglomeration 
 
 
-1.032*** 
(0.047) 
-0.910*** 
(0.062) 
-0.183 
(0.436) 
-1.062*** 
(0.166) 
Intra X Quality  
 
 
 
-0.275** 
(0.093) 
 
 
 
 
Intra X Size  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.181+ 
(0.092) 
 
 
Intra X Franchise  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.033 
(0.172) 
Constant 1.097* 
(0.475) 
1.322** 
(0.416) 
1.287** 
(0.416) 
1.057* 
(0.437) 
1.331** 
(0.419) 
Observations 1682 1682 1682 1682 1682 
R2 0.161 0.356 0.359 0.357 0.356 
F 4.546 12.912 12.915 12.805 12.721 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Appendix C. Results of Fixed-Effects OLS Model (DV: Average Distance within 3 km) 
 Geographic distance (within 3km) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
City dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
City population 0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Airport -0.265*** 
(0.059) 
-0.271*** 
(0.054) 
-0.271*** 
(0.054) 
-0.273*** 
(0.054) 
-0.271*** 
(0.054) 
Interstate -0.228** 
(0.076) 
-0.268*** 
(0.070) 
-0.266*** 
(0.070) 
-0.268*** 
(0.070) 
-0.268*** 
(0.070) 
Resort 0.132 
(0.139) 
0.095 
(0.128) 
0.109 
(0.127) 
0.088 
(0.128) 
0.097 
(0.128) 
Small metro/town -0.078 
(0.122) 
-0.162 
(0.112) 
-0.152 
(0.112) 
-0.157 
(0.112) 
-0.162 
(0.112) 
Suburban -0.098+ 
(0.053) 
-0.128** 
(0.049) 
-0.129** 
(0.049) 
-0.131** 
(0.049) 
-0.128** 
(0.049) 
Number of luxury 
hotels 
0.013 
(0.015) 
0.002 
(0.014) 
0.003 
(0.013) 
0.003 
(0.014) 
0.003 
(0.014) 
Number of upper 
upscale hotels 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
Number of upscale 
hotels 
0.013** 
(0.005) 
0.016*** 
(0.004) 
0.016*** 
(0.004) 
0.017*** 
(0.004) 
0.017*** 
(0.004) 
Number of upper 
midscale hotels 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
Number of 
midscale hotels 
-0.009+ 
(0.005) 
-0.008+ 
(0.004) 
-0.009* 
(0.004) 
-0.008+ 
(0.004) 
-0.008+ 
(0.004) 
Number of 
economy hotels 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Number of same 
brand hotels 
-0.012 
(0.015) 
-0.015 
(0.014) 
-0.013 
(0.014) 
-0.015 
(0.014) 
-0.015 
(0.014) 
Price distance 0.072*** 
(0.006) 
0.072*** 
(0.006) 
0.072*** 
(0.006) 
0.072*** 
(0.006) 
0.072*** 
(0.006) 
Size distance 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Dummy for quality 
of a new hotel 
-0.072* 
(0.035) 
-0.041 
(0.032) 
0.024 
(0.036) 
-0.041 
(0.032) 
-0.040 
(0.032) 
Size of a new hotel 0.022 
(0.044) 
0.037 
(0.041) 
0.037 
(0.040) 
0.062 
(0.044) 
0.037 
(0.041) 
Dummy for -0.097+ -0.094+ -0.098+ -0.094+ -0.119* 
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franchise (0.056) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.059) 
Intra-firm 
agglomeration 
 
 
-0.464*** 
(0.027) 
-0.368*** 
(0.036) 
-0.094 
(0.252) 
-0.548*** 
(0.096) 
Intra X Quality  
 
 
 
-0.215*** 
(0.053) 
 
 
 
 
Intra X Size  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.079 
(0.053) 
 
 
Intra X Franchise  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.090 
(0.099) 
Constant 0.745** 
(0.259) 
0.853*** 
(0.238) 
0.824*** 
(0.237) 
0.736** 
(0.251) 
0.876*** 
(0.239) 
Observations 1682 1682 1682 1682 1682 
R2 0.186 0.312 0.319 0.313 0.313 
F 5.407 10.602 10.781 10.490 10.461 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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RESULTS OF FIXED-EFFECTS OLS MODEL (DV: DYADIC DISTANCE WITHIN 5 
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Appendix D. Results of Fixed-Effects OLS Model (DV: Dyadic Distance within 5 km) 
 Geographic distance (within 5km) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
City dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
City population -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Airport -0.195*** 
(0.046) 
-0.193*** 
(0.046) 
-0.192*** 
(0.046) 
-0.192*** 
(0.046) 
-0.193*** 
(0.046) 
Interstate -0.617*** 
(0.082) 
-0.620*** 
(0.082) 
-0.618*** 
(0.082) 
-0.614*** 
(0.082) 
-0.619*** 
(0.082) 
Resort 0.280* 
(0.133) 
0.273* 
(0.133) 
0.277* 
(0.133) 
0.275* 
(0.133) 
0.274* 
(0.133) 
Small metro/town -0.141 
(0.170) 
-0.159 
(0.170) 
-0.151 
(0.170) 
-0.146 
(0.170) 
-0.158 
(0.170) 
Suburban 0.088* 
(0.043) 
0.089* 
(0.043) 
0.089* 
(0.043) 
0.091* 
(0.043) 
0.089* 
(0.043) 
Number of luxury 
hotels 
-0.053*** 
(0.012) 
-0.053*** 
(0.012) 
-0.053*** 
(0.012) 
-0.053*** 
(0.012) 
-0.053*** 
(0.012) 
Number of upper 
upscale hotels 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
Number of upscale 
hotels 
0.026*** 
(0.004) 
0.027*** 
(0.004) 
0.027*** 
(0.004) 
0.027*** 
(0.004) 
0.027*** 
(0.004) 
Number of upper 
midscale hotels 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
Number of 
midscale hotels 
-0.019*** 
(0.004) 
-0.020*** 
(0.004) 
-0.020*** 
(0.004) 
-0.020*** 
(0.004) 
-0.020*** 
(0.004) 
Number of 
economy hotels 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
Number of same 
brand hotels 
-0.007 
(0.015) 
-0.007 
(0.015) 
-0.006 
(0.015) 
-0.006 
(0.015) 
-0.006 
(0.015) 
Price distance 0.061*** 
(0.004) 
0.059*** 
(0.004) 
0.059*** 
(0.004) 
0.059*** 
(0.004) 
0.059*** 
(0.004) 
Size distance -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Dummy for quality 
of a new hotel 
-0.059+ 
(0.030) 
-0.056+ 
(0.030) 
-0.025 
(0.031) 
-0.057+ 
(0.030) 
-0.056+ 
(0.030) 
Size of a new hotel -0.006 
(0.037) 
-0.003 
(0.037) 
-0.003 
(0.037) 
0.022 
(0.037) 
-0.003 
(0.037) 
Dummy for 
franchise 
-0.057 
(0.045) 
-0.058 
(0.045) 
-0.059 
(0.045) 
-0.058 
(0.045) 
-0.065 
(0.046) 
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Intra-firm 
agglomeration 
 
 
-0.326*** 
(0.040) 
-0.164** 
(0.054) 
1.083** 
(0.374) 
-0.404** 
(0.131) 
Intra X Quality  
 
 
 
-0.359*** 
(0.080) 
 
 
 
 
Intra X Size  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.298*** 
(0.079) 
 
 
Intra X Franchise  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.087 
(0.137) 
Constant 2.073*** 
(0.215) 
2.116*** 
(0.215) 
2.099*** 
(0.215) 
1.988*** 
(0.217) 
2.122*** 
(0.215) 
Observations 20254 20254 20254 20254 20254 
R2 0.054 0.057 0.058 0.058 0.057 
F 16.873 17.634 17.683 17.598 17.387 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Appendix E. Results of Tobit Model (DV: Average Distance within 5 km) 
 Geographic distance (within 5km) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
City dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
City population 0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Airport -0.055 
(0.104) 
-0.068 
(0.091) 
-0.069 
(0.091) 
-0.074 
(0.091) 
-0.068 
(0.091) 
Interstate -0.345* 
(0.138) 
-0.434*** 
(0.121) 
-0.431*** 
(0.120) 
-0.433*** 
(0.121) 
-0.434*** 
(0.121) 
Resort 0.322 
(0.249) 
0.257 
(0.218) 
0.274 
(0.218) 
0.240 
(0.218) 
0.257 
(0.218) 
Small metro/town 0.041 
(0.219) 
-0.139 
(0.192) 
-0.125 
(0.191) 
-0.125 
(0.192) 
-0.138 
(0.192) 
Suburban 0.226* 
(0.095) 
0.162+ 
(0.084) 
0.160+ 
(0.083) 
0.157+ 
(0.084) 
0.162+ 
(0.084) 
Number of luxury 
hotels 
0.000 
(0.026) 
-0.024 
(0.023) 
-0.023 
(0.023) 
-0.023 
(0.023) 
-0.024 
(0.023) 
Number of upper 
upscale hotels 
-0.009 
(0.014) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
0.000 
(0.012) 
0.000 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
Number of upscale 
hotels 
0.026** 
(0.008) 
0.034*** 
(0.007) 
0.033*** 
(0.007) 
0.034*** 
(0.007) 
0.034*** 
(0.007) 
Number of upper 
midscale hotels 
0.006 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
Number of 
midscale hotels 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
Number of 
economy hotels 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.004+ 
(0.002) 
0.004+ 
(0.002) 
0.004+ 
(0.002) 
0.004+ 
(0.002) 
Number of same 
brand hotels 
-0.009 
(0.027) 
-0.015 
(0.024) 
-0.013 
(0.024) 
-0.014 
(0.024) 
-0.015 
(0.024) 
Price distance 0.089*** 
(0.010) 
0.092*** 
(0.008) 
0.092*** 
(0.008) 
0.092*** 
(0.008) 
0.092*** 
(0.008) 
Size distance 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Dummy for quality 
of a new hotel 
-0.219*** 
(0.062) 
-0.147** 
(0.055) 
-0.064 
(0.061) 
-0.148** 
(0.055) 
-0.146** 
(0.055) 
Size of a new hotel 0.031 
(0.081) 
0.062 
(0.071) 
0.062 
(0.070) 
0.118 
(0.076) 
0.062 
(0.071) 
Dummy for -0.112 -0.109 -0.114 -0.109 -0.118 
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franchise (0.101) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.100) 
Intra-firm 
agglomeration 
 
 
-1.033*** 
(0.046) 
-0.911*** 
(0.061) 
-0.182 
(0.427) 
-1.065*** 
(0.163) 
Intra X Quality  
 
 
 
-0.274** 
(0.091) 
 
 
 
 
Intra X Size  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.181* 
(0.091) 
 
 
Intra X Franchise  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.034 
(0.168) 
Constant 1.194** 
(0.461) 
1.332** 
(0.409) 
1.296** 
(0.408) 
1.066* 
(0.429) 
1.341** 
(0.411) 
Observations 1682 1682 1682 1682 1682 
Pseudo R2 0.063 0.158 0.160 0.159 0.158 
Log-likelihood -2187.680 -1965.203 -1960.682 -1963.202 -1965.182 
Chi2 293.747 738.702 747.744 742.704 738.744 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Appendix F. Results of First Stage Probit Model 
 Hotel establishment 
Year dummy Included 
City dummy Included 
Firm dummy Included 
City population 0.000 
(0.000) 
Airport 0.221*** 
(0.058) 
Interstate 0.199** 
(0.064) 
Resort 0.067 
(0.134) 
Small metro/town 0.246*** 
(0.062) 
Suburban 0.192*** 
(0.044) 
Number of luxury hotels -0.036** 
(0.014) 
Number of upper upscale hotels 0.005 
(0.007) 
Number of upscale hotels 0.002 
(0.004) 
Number of upper midscale hotels 0.004 
(0.004) 
Number of midscale hotels 0.013** 
(0.005) 
Number of economy hotels 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Number of hotel failures 0.004 
(0.017) 
Number of hotels of a parent firm 0.027*** 
(0.006) 
Constant -1.426*** 
(0.125) 
Observations 21390 
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Pseudo R2 0.177 
Log likelihood -6870.313 
Chi2 2960.380 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Appendix G. Results of Second Stage OLS Model 
 Geographic distance (within 5km) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included 
City dummy Included Included Included Included 
Firm dummy Included Included Included Included 
IMR -1.435*** 
(0.335) 
-1.387*** 
(0.336) 
-1.419*** 
(0.336) 
-1.434*** 
(0.335) 
City population -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Airport -0.106 
(0.089) 
-0.105 
(0.089) 
-0.111 
(0.089) 
-0.106 
(0.089) 
Interstate -0.461*** 
(0.114) 
-0.457*** 
(0.113) 
-0.460*** 
(0.114) 
-0.461*** 
(0.114) 
Resort 0.290 
(0.225) 
0.305 
(0.222) 
0.274 
(0.225) 
0.291 
(0.225) 
Small metro/town -0.177 
(0.189) 
-0.163 
(0.190) 
-0.163 
(0.190) 
-0.176 
(0.189) 
Suburban 0.126 
(0.078) 
0.125 
(0.078) 
0.121 
(0.078) 
0.126 
(0.078) 
Number of luxury 
hotels 
0.035 
(0.027) 
0.034 
(0.027) 
0.035 
(0.027) 
0.035 
(0.027) 
Number of upper 
upscale hotels 
-0.004 
(0.013) 
-0.004 
(0.013) 
-0.004 
(0.013) 
-0.004 
(0.013) 
Number of upscale 
hotels 
0.027*** 
(0.008) 
0.026*** 
(0.008) 
0.027*** 
(0.008) 
0.027*** 
(0.008) 
Number of upper 
midscale hotels 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
Number of midscale 
hotels 
-0.025** 
(0.008) 
-0.025** 
(0.008) 
-0.026** 
(0.008) 
-0.025** 
(0.008) 
Number of economy 
hotels 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
Number of same 
brand hotels 
-0.045+ 
(0.027) 
-0.041 
(0.027) 
-0.043 
(0.027) 
-0.045 
(0.027) 
Price distance 0.094*** 
(0.009) 
0.094*** 
(0.009) 
0.094*** 
(0.009) 
0.094*** 
(0.009) 
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Size distance 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Dummy for quality 
of a new hotel 
-0.149** 
(0.055) 
-0.072 
(0.060) 
-0.150** 
(0.055) 
-0.149** 
(0.055) 
Size of a new hotel 0.046 
(0.067) 
0.047 
(0.067) 
0.099 
(0.070) 
0.046 
(0.067) 
Dummy for 
franchise 
-0.081 
(0.081) 
-0.087 
(0.081) 
-0.082 
(0.081) 
-0.089 
(0.088) 
Intra-firm 
agglomeration 
-1.055*** 
(0.048) 
-0.941*** 
(0.065) 
-0.254 
(0.408) 
-1.081*** 
(0.154) 
Intra X Quality  
 
-0.254** 
(0.095) 
 
 
 
 
Intra X Size  
 
 
 
-0.171* 
(0.085) 
 
 
Intra X Franchise  
 
 
 
 
 
0.028 
(0.161) 
Constant 3.688*** 
(0.685) 
3.577*** 
(0.687) 
3.412*** 
(0.695) 
3.695*** 
(0.685) 
Observations 1682 1682 1682 1682 
R2 0.364 0.366 0.365 0.364 
F 18.120 18.328 18.287 17.873 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
